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The doctrine of tenure in Australia
post-Mabo: Replacing the ‘feudal fiction’
with the ‘mere radical title fiction’ — Part 2
Dr Ulla Secher*
Until the decision of the High Court in Mabo, the universal acceptance and
application of the English doctrine of tenure in Australia led to the view that
all titles, rights and interests in land had to be the direct consequence of
some grant of the Crown. In Mabo, however, six justices of the High Court
agreed that the common law, as it had been previously understood, should
be changed to recognise native title rights to land; rights which do not derive
from a Crown grant. The common law device adopted by the High Court to
effect this change, and thereby reconcile the doctrine of tenure and native
title when the Crown acquired sovereignty of Australia, was ‘radical title’.
This two-part article examines how the Mabo High Court redefined the
English doctrine of tenure, or, more accurately, defined the Australian
doctrine of tenure, by developing the concept of radical title. It will be seen
that in order to achieve this redefinition, the court had to clarify two
interrelated aspects of the common law: the applicability of the English
(feudal) doctrine of tenure in Australia and the legal effect of the
classification of Australia as settled. Part 1 lays the foundation for this
analysis by examining the genesis of the doctrine of tenure in pre-Conquest
England and the pre-Mabo effect of the colonisation of Australia and the
reception of English land. The question posed in Part 2 is twofold: first, how
and why the Australian doctrine of tenure, with radical title as its postulate,
diverges from the doctrine of tenure in English land law. Secondly, what are
the implications, beyond recognition of native title, of the redefined doctrine
of tenure for Australian real property law? Crucially, it will be seen that the
implications of the Australian doctrine of tenure are suggested by either
pre-feudal forms of landholding or the traditional exceptions to the feudal
doctrine of tenure, which both include allodial landholding. In particular, it will
be seen that the High Court’s restatement of the common law provides a
basis upon which ‘Aboriginal customary law title’ can be a valid source of
non-derivative common law title to land and thus an alternative to native title.
1 Introduction
In Part 1 we saw that, pre-Mabo, the universal acceptance and application of
the English doctrine of tenure in Australia precluded recognition of rights in
land which were not derived from Crown grant. We also saw, however, that
within strict feudal theory, title to land can and does exist both independently
of any grant (as in the case of allodial landholding, ecclesiastical tenures, title
by occupancy of a vacant pur autre vie estate and title by adverse possession)
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and independently of the present sovereign’s grant (as in the case of tenure in
ancient demesne). Nevertheless, because the fictional explanation of the
universality of feudal tenure encompasses Crown grants as well as original
Crown ownership, the relevant grant is deemed in law to have been made.1
Because the very essence of allodial landholding is that the land is held of no
superior, allodial title and the concept of lord paramount2 are, by definition,
mutually exclusive. Allodial title is, therefore, the only true exception to the
feudal doctrine of tenure.3
Nevertheless, because of the designation of Australia as ‘settled’ for the
purpose of the common law doctrine of reception, the feudal doctrine of
tenure was regarded as applicable to describe the legal nature of landholding
in Australia. It followed, therefore, that the concept of radical title was simply
regarded as inapplicable in the Australian land law context: upon settlement,
the Crown acquired absolute beneficial ownership of all land in Australia.
Since the Crown was regarded as the absolute beneficial owner of all land in
Australia, there was no room for any concept of radical title. The Crown’s
radical title had, however, been recognised in cases decided in other colonial
jurisdictions and, significantly, by theAustralian High Court when considering
the legal effect of the British annexation of Papua New Guinea.4 Crucially, it
will be seen in this Part that, post-Mabo, with radical title as its postulate, the
Australian doctrine of tenure is very different from the doctrine of tenure in
English land law. Indeed, it will be seen that many of the implications of the
Australian doctrine of tenure are suggested by either pre-feudal forms of
landholding or the traditional exceptions to the feudal doctrine of tenure,
which both include allodial landholding. In particular, it will be seen that the
High Court’s restatement of the common law provides a basis upon which
Aboriginal customary law can amount to an independent source of
non-derivative common law title to land.
1 K McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p 82; K McNeil,
‘A Question of Title: Has the Common Law been Misapplied to Dispossess the
Aboriginals?’ (1990) 16(1) MonLR 91 at 106.
2 See Part 1, text accompanying n 129.
3 The parallels between allodial land as a true exception to the doctrine of tenure and the High
Court’s identification of native title as an interest that does not owe its existence to a Crown
grant, actual or presumed, are examined by U Secher, A Conceptual Analysis of the Origins,
Application and Implications of the Doctrine of Radical Title of the Crown in Australia: an
Inhabited Settled Colony, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, UNSW, 2003, Ch 9.
4 See Part 1, text accompanying n 231. For a detailed analysis of the cases decided in other
colonial jurisdictions before Mabo in which the Crown’s ‘radical title’ had been recognised,
see U Secher, ‘The Meaning of Radical Title: the Pre-MaboAuthorities Explained — Part 1’
(2005) 11(3) APLJ 179 and ‘The Meaning of Radical Title: The Pre-Mabo Authorities
Explained — Part 2’ (2005) 11(3) APLJ 209.
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2 The Australian doctrine of tenure: Radical title as
the postulate of the doctrine of tenure5
A The Mabo decision
Since the plaintiffs in Mabo did not deny the Crown’s sovereignty over the
Murray Islands nor the Crown’s radical title to the land, the principal question
in Mabo was whether the annexation of the Murray Islands to the colony of
Queensland in 1879 vested ‘. . . absolute ownership of, legal possession of and
exclusive power to confer title to, all land in the Murray Islands’ in the
Crown.6 The defendant claimed that several common law doctrines, which
supported exclusive Crown ownership of all land in the Australian colonies,
were inconsistent with the recognition of native title; the most important basis
for ownership asserted being the doctrine of tenure.7 It was argued that
because the doctrine of tenure was the basis of all legal title to land in
Australia, the ultimate owner of all land in Australia was the Crown.
Accordingly, anyone holding land in Australia was holding land of the
Crown.8 Since the plaintiffs’ native title did not derive from any Crown grant,
its recognition was inconsistent with the common law.9
Although the court was unanimous in confirming that the doctrine of tenure
is an essential principle of land law in Australia,10 the majority rejected the
argument that recognition of native title was inconsistent with the Crown’s
radical title and the doctrine of tenure. On analysis, it will be seen that, in
reaching this decision, the majority judges defined the Australian doctrine of
tenure and, consequently, retrospectively modified the doctrine of tenure as
understood in English law.
The six majority justices agreed that the Australian doctrine of tenure is
fundamentally different from its English counterpart. Nevertheless, the
judgments reveal two distinct approaches vis-a`-vis the circumstances in which
5 This section is adapted from, and expands upon, Part III of the author’s article: U Secher,
‘Aboriginal Customary Law Versus Native Title: the Mabo Decision — Preserving the
Distinction between “Settled” and “Conquered or Ceded” Territories’ (2005) 24 (1) UQLJ
35.
6 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 25 per Brennan J; 107 ALR 1 (Mabo).
Brennan J summarised the defendant’s argument (at CLR 26) to be that:
when the territory of a settled colony became part of the Crown’s dominions, the law of
England so far as applicable to the colonial conditions became the law of the colony and,
by that law, the Crown acquired the absolute beneficial ownership of all land in the
territory . . . and no right or interest in land in the territory could thereafter be possessed
by any other person unless granted by the Crown.
7 Mabo, ibid, at CLR 31–2 per Brennan J; see also 59–60 per Deane and Gaudron JJ. The
three other bases for ownership asserted by the defendant were: the expanded doctrine of
terra nullius pursuant to which absolute beneficial ownership flowed automatically from
sovereignty because there was ‘no other proprietor’ (which is discussed by Secher, above
n 3, Ch 4); the patrimony of the nation basis; and the royal prerogative basis. The court
examined and rejected all three: see text accompanying nn 45ff below.
8 See Part 1, section headed ‘The Norman Conquest: Establishment of Feudal Tenure’, text
accompanying nn 104ff.
9 This position was supported by the decision in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR
141; [1972-73] ALR 65 which is discussed in Part 1, text immediately following nn 220ff.
10 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 45–52 per Brennan J; 80, 81, 102–4 per Deane and Gaudron; 180
per Toohey J; 122–3 per Dawson J.
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the Australian doctrine operates: four justices, Brennan J (as he then was),
with whom Mason CJ and McHugh J agreed, and Toohey J, attributed a
narrow sphere of operation to the Australian doctrine of tenure, while two
justices, Deane and Gaudron JJ, suggested a broader application.
Consequently, it will be seen, that Brennan and Toohey JJ’s version of the
Australian doctrine of tenure represents a more radical departure from the
English doctrine of tenure than Deane and Gaudron JJ’s version. Furthermore,
notwithstanding the similar approaches adopted by Brennan and Toohey JJ,
there is an important difference between their judgments: while Brennan J’s
conclusion on the role of the doctrine of tenure in Australia is express,
Toohey J’s is implied.
As Brennan J’s reasons were adopted by Mason CJ and McHugh J, his
leading judgment represents a fundamental restatement of the doctrine of
tenure as it applies in Australia.11 Noting that the land law of England is based
on the doctrine of tenure12 and that the fiction of royal grants underlies this
English doctrine,13 Brennan J accepted that the doctrine of tenure is a basic
doctrine of Australian land law14 and that Crown grants are the foundation of
that doctrine.15 Consequently, Brennan J considered it ‘an essential
prerequisite that the Crown have such a title to land as would invest the
Sovereign with the character of Paramount Lord in respect of a tenure created
by grant and would attract the incidents appropriate to the tenure . . .’.16
Accordingly, the ‘Crown was treated as having the radical [ultimate or final]
title to all land in the territory over which the Crown acquired sovereignty’.17
This radical title, adapted from feudal theory, had two limbs: it was both
‘a postulate of the doctrine of tenure and a concomitant of sovereignty’.18
Brennan J reasoned that as a postulate of the doctrine of tenure, the notion of
radical title ‘enabled the Crown to become Paramount Lord of all who hold
a tenure granted by the Crown’. As a concomitant of sovereignty, the notion
of radical title enabled the Crown ‘to become absolute beneficial owner of
unalienated land required for the Crown’s purposes’.19
According to Brennan J, therefore, the two limbs of the Crown’s radical title
simply enabled the English doctrine of tenure to be applied, and the Crown’s
plenary title to be acquired, in colonial Australia. Consequently, Brennan J
emphasised that ‘it is not a corollary of the Crown’s acquisition of a radical
11 See also Part 4 ‘Post-Mabo Developments’, text accompanying n 176 below.
12 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 46.
13 Ibid, at CLR 47. The development of the fiction of original Crown grant (and fiction of
original Crown ownership) is examined in Part 1, text accompanying n 104 ff.
14 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 45. Brennan J’s consideration of ‘[t]he feudal basis of the
proposition of absolute Crown ownership’ was prefaced with the following caution: ‘A basic
doctrine of the land law is the doctrine of tenure . . . and it is a doctrine which could not be
overturned without fracturing the skeleton which gives our land law its shape and
consistency’. See also Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1; 184 ALR 113 at [178],
where McHugh J observed that the doctrine of tenure ‘is the basis of the land law of England
and Australia’.
15 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 47.
16 Ibid, at CLR 47–8.
17 Ibid, at 48.
18 Id.
19 Id (emphasis added).
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title to land in an occupied territory that the Crown acquired absolute
beneficial ownership of that land to the exclusion of the indigenous
inhabitants’.20 By drawing a distinction between the title to land which the
Crown acquires upon acquisition of sovereignty and the rights to the use and
benefit of that land which might be vested in some person or entity other than
the Crown, Brennan J concluded that ‘[t]he doctrine of tenure applies to every
Crown grant of an interest in land, but not to rights and interests which do not
owe their existence to a Crown grant’.21
In this way, Brennan J articulated the limited role of the doctrine of tenure
in Australian land law. Only when the Crown exercises its power to grant an
estate in land is such land brought within the regime governed by the doctrine
of tenure.22 This is critical and represents the essential point of divergence
between the Australian and English versions of the doctrine of tenure. Under
the Australian doctrine of tenure, the two-fold feudal fiction of original Crown
ownership of all land and original Crown grant no longer applies.23 The fiction
of original Crown grant has been rendered otiose and the fiction of original
Crown ownership has been replaced with the ‘fiction of original Crown
ownership of land which has actually been granted by the Crown’.
This is crucial and has significant implications for the rule that the King can
only grant to or take from a subject by record.24 The object of this rule is to
‘support the fundamental principle of English law, that the King may not enter
upon or seize any man’s possessions upon bare surmises, without the
intervention of a jury’.25 Thus, unless the Crown’s possession and title are
original, for the Crown to be in possession in the first place, it must have a
recorded title.26 That is, the Crown has possession because it has title, not vice
versa.27 Where a record of the Crown’s title was lacking, one of the
prerogative procedures devised for providing redress for the Crown against a
20 Id.
21 Ibid, at 48–9.
22 See also text accompanying n 98 below; Wik Peoples and Thayorre People v Queensland
(1996) 187 CLR 1 at 91 per Brennan CJ (Dawson and McHugh JJ concurring); 141 ALR
129 (Wik); Secher, above n 3, Ch 4, p 129.
23 The two-fold fiction accompanying the English (feudal) doctrine of tenure is discussed in
Part 1, esp text accompanying nn 111–126.
24 J Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown and the Relative Rights and
Duties of the Subject, Joseph Butterworth & Son, London, 1820, pp 389–91 The principle on
which this rule rests is ‘that the King cannot eneter onto a subjects possessions on bare
surmises, without the intervention of a jury’: G S Lester, The Territorial Rights of the Inuit
of the Canadian Northwest Territories: A Legal Argument, D Juris Thesis, York University,
Toronto, 1981, p 977.
25 Chitty, above n 24, p 247; Lester, above n 24, p 977; W Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the
Laws of England: Of Private Wrongs, A Facsimile of the First Edition, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979, p 259. This rule may have developed as a consequence of
Ch 29 of the Magna Carta which provides that ‘[n]o Freeman shall . . . be disseised of his
Freehold . . . but by the lawful Judgement of his Peers, or by the law of the Land’: (1225)
9 Hen III.
26 The author has shown elsewhere that the Crown did not acquire title to all land in Australia
by occupancy: Secher, above n 3, Ch 7, text accompanying nn 41ff. Cf McNeil, Common
Law Aboriginal Title, above n 1, p 135.
27 McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, above n 1, p 106. Although McNeil treats the
foreshore and the territorial sea-bed as an exception to this rule (pp 103–5), see discussion
by Secher, above n 3, Ch 5.
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subject in possession was the inquest of office or office. Chitty defined inquest
of office as:
an inquiry made (through the medium of an indefinite number of jurors summoned
by the sheriff); by the King’s officer, his sheriff, coronor, or escheator, virtute offıcii,
or by writ to them sent for that purpose, or by commissioners specially appointed,
concerning any matter that entitles the King to the possession of lands or tenements,
goods or chattels.28
The general rule was that an office of inquest was necessary in all cases
where a common person cannot have a possession, neither in deed nor in law,
without an entry.29 That is, in the absence of other record of the Crown’s title,
an office was necessary to give the Crown possession whenever lands were in
the possession of a subject when the Crown’s title accrued.30 According to
Blackstone, an office was employed:
to enquire whether the king’s tenant for life died seised, whereby the reversion
accrues to the king: whether A, who held immediately of the crown, died without
heirs; in which case the lands belong to the king by escheat: whether B be attained
of treason; whereby his estate forfeited to the crown: whether C, who has purchased
lands, be an alien; which is another cause of forfeiture: whether D be an idiot
a nativitate; and therefore together with his lands, appertains to the custody of the
king.31
An office was not, however, necessary when the Crown’s title already
appeared ‘in any shape of record’.32 In this context it has been stated that there
are two exceptions to the general rule that the Crown cannot have possession
without an office or other record in all cases where a common person cannot
have a possession in deed or in law without an entry. The first exception arises
as follows:
Like law hath been used where his Highness is to seize lands of priors, aliens within
this realm ratione guerre, his Highness doth it without any office, for in both these
cases the King’s title is notorious enough although it appear not of record. But yet
in these cases his Highness must seize ere he can have any interest in his lands,
because they be penal towards the party.33
Thus, although an office is unnecessary in the case of lands of aliens
forfeited, ratione guerre, the Crown is not considered as entitled until there is
an actual seizure. The more important exception for present purposes is that:
28 Chitty, above n 24, p 246. Chitty had adopted Blackstone’s definition: Blackstone, above
n 25, p 258. For a detailed discussion of the inquest of office, see Secher, above n 3, Ch 7,
text accompanying nn 122ff.
29 Chitty, above n 24, p 249: ‘in all cases where a common person can not have a possession
neither in deed nor in law withot an entre’. See also McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title,
above n 1, p 96 and Lester, above n 24, p 273.
30 McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, above n 1, p 96.
31 Blackstone, above n 25, p 258; W S Holdsworth, 10 A History of English Law, 1st ed,
3rd Impression, Methuen & Co Ltd and Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1975, p 343. Cf
Chitty, above n 24, p 249; McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, above n 1, pp 96–7.
32 Chitty, above n 24, p 248.
33 Ibid, p 249, quoting William Stanford, Prerogativa Regis.
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if possession in law or a freehold, be cast upon the King, as it may be on a common
person, there as the freehold ought not to be in suspense, the King is entitled and
may seize without any office.34
Thus, if possession in law is cast upon the Crown, no office is necessary.
Importantly, this exception presupposes that the King originally had title to all
land and that title passed from the King to the grantee or that the King was
acquiring derivatively as beneficiary under a will.35 Under the post-Mabo
Australian doctrine of tenure, however, the fiction of original Crown
ownership no longer applies before a tenure has been created by Crown
grant.36 Post-Mabo, therefore, possession is only cast upon the Crown in
limited circumstances: namely, where there has in fact been a grant of an
interest in land, and then only for the duration of the grant.37 In such
circumstances, the fiction of original Crown ownership is brought into play so
that the Crown can pass derivative title to the grantee. Importantly, however,
the effect of the doctrine of tenure in this context is not to give the Crown title
to the land. The fictional explanation merely justifies the feudal concept of
Paramount Lordship. The Crown’s fictional possession is, however, no longer
as fictional as it was under the feudal doctrine of tenure. Since this fictional
possession only applies where there has been an actual Crown grant, the
redefined doctrine of tenure has some factual justification: as the grantee will
invariably be in actual possession of the land, the Crown can be regarded as
vicariously in possession of the land.
By rejecting the ‘feudal fiction’38 in favour of the more limited ‘radical title
fiction’ for the purpose of the Australian doctrine of tenure, the Crown’s initial
rights over land, although still fictional, are no longer as fictional as under
feudal theory. On the basis of his examination of the doctrine of tenure as it
applies in Australia, therefore, Brennan J found that the Crown’s acquisition
of a radical title to all land upon assumption of sovereignty39 was consistent
with the recognition of native title to land:
for radical title, without more, is merely a logical postulate required to support the
doctrine of tenure (when the Crown has exercised its sovereign power to grant an
34 Id. See also Sir John Comyns, A Digest of the Laws of England, 5th ed, A Strahan, London,
1822, reproduced in Lester, above n 24, p 274.
35 Lester, above n 24, p 274.
36 Indeed, even where land has been brought within the doctrine of tenure, if the land is subject
to native title and the particular Crown dealing with the land is ineffectual to extinguish all
the native title interest, the fiction applies only partially; it does not confer absolute
beneficial ownership on the Crown or the particular Crown grantee: see discussion at text
immediately following n 188 below.
37 See, generally, Secher, above n 3, Ch 4.
38 At least partially.
39 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 45–52, esp at 48. Brennan J also thought that the ‘English legal
system accommodated the recognition of rights and interests derived from occupation of
land in a territory over which sovereignty was acquired by conquest without the necessity of
a Crown grant’: at 49. He relied on the Case of Tanistry (1608) Davis 28; 80 ER 516 and
Witrong v Blany (1674) 3 Keb 401; 84 ER 789, as precedent for this view. This is significant:
the Case of Tanistry is authority for the proposition that the Crown cannot be said to be in
actual possession of land unless it appears by some record that such land was appropriated
to the Crown as its own demesne: see Secher, above n 3, Chs 4 and 7.
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interest in land) and to support the plenary title of the Crown (when the Crown has
exercised its sovereign power to appropriate to itself ownership of parcels of land
within the Crown’s territory).40
Thus, rather than holding that ‘the dispossession of the indigenous
inhabitants of Australia’ was worked by ‘a transfer of beneficial ownership
when sovereignty was acquired by the Crown’, Brennan J reasoned that this
dispossession was achieved ‘by the recurrent exercise of a paramount power
to exclude the indigenous inhabitants from their traditional lands as colonial
settlement expanded and land was granted to colonists’.41 Brennan J
concluded that it was only the fallacy of equating sovereignty and beneficial
ownership of land that had given rise to the notion that native title was
extinguished by the acquisition of sovereignty;42 the ‘notion that feudal
principle dictates that the land in a settled colony be taken to be a royal
demesne upon the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty is mistaken’.43
This aspect of Brennan J’s reasoning clearly supports the proposition that
radical title is merely a bare legal title to land, investiture of which creates no
automatic beneficial entitlement to the land to which it relates. Radical title
merely supports the doctrine of tenure and the Crown’s acquisition of a
plenary title to particular land. On this analysis, radical title is a power of
alienation which enables the Crown to invest persons, including itself, with
beneficial ownership of land. That is, as ‘a concomitant of sovereignty’,
radical title confers power on the Crown to grant land in every part of
Australia so that the doctrine of tenure (with radical title as its ‘postulate’)
may apply to that land. Until the Crown exercises its sovereign power to
create interests in land in itself or others, neither the Crown nor any person
claiming a derivative title from the Crown, has any interest in the land.44
Support for this interpretation of radical title is also evident in Brennan J’s
40 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 50.
41 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 58 per Brennan J; see also 103–9 per Deane and Gaudron JJ. See
also Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 at 433–4 per Mason CJ,
Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; 128 ALR 1:
since the establishment of the colony [of Western Australia] native title in respect of
particular parcels of land has been extinguished only parcel by parcel. It has been
extinguished by the valid exercise of power to grant interests in some of those parcels
and to appropriate others of them for the use of the Crown inconsistently with the
continuing right of Aborigines to enjoy native title.
42 On the legal implications of confusing sovereignty and ownership, see also Secher, above
n 3, Ch 1, pp 25, 37. Accordingly, Brennan J concluded that the native title of the indigenous
inhabitants was to be treated as a burden on the radical title which the Crown acquired.
43 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 52. See also Brennan J’s observations at 45:
It was only by fastening on to the notion that a settled colony was terra nullius that it was
possible to predicate of the Crown the acquisition of ownership of land in a colony
already occupied by the indigenous inhabitants. It was only on the hypothesis that there
was nobody in occupation that it could be said that the Crown was the owner because
there was no other. If that hypothesis be rejected, the notion that sovereignty carried
ownership in its wake must be rejected too.
It will be seen, in Part 3 below ‘The Reception of Land Law into the Australian Colonies
Revisited’, that the High Court redefined the constitutional status of Australia: see text
immediately following n 115 below.
44 Thus securing the Crown as the original source of all derivative title to land for the purposes
of the Australian doctrine of tenure. ‘Land in Australia which has been granted by the Crown
is held on a tenure of some kind and the titles acquired under the accepted land law cannot
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treatment of two of the three alternative bases advanced, by the defendant in
Mabo, to establish the proposition of absolute Crown ownership: the
patrimony of the nation basis and the royal prerogative basis.45
Considering the ‘royal prerogative’ basis, Brennan J observed that the
passing of the management and control of the waste lands of the Crown to the
Colonial Governments, by Imperial legislation, was not a transfer of title, but
rather a transfer of political power or governmental function.46 Importantly,
Brennan J expressly confirmed that the requirement that the Crown take
further steps to become owner of land is not limited to land in respect of which
pre-existing native title exists, for:
if the Crown’s title is merely a radical title — no more than a logical postulate to
support the exercise of a sovereign power within the familiar feudal framework of
the common law — the problem of vesting of the absolute beneficial ownership of
colonial land does not arise: absolute beneficial ownership can be acquired, if at all,
by an exercise of the appropriate sovereign power.47
Brennan J’s analysis of the ‘patrimony of the nation’ basis for the
proposition of absolute Crown ownership also indicates that radical title is
merely in the nature of a governmental power, enabling the Crown to create
interests in land in itself and others, rather than a proprietary right.48Although
Brennan J agreed that ‘it is right to describe the powers which the Crown . . .
exercised with respect to colonial lands as powers conferred for the benefit of
the nation as a whole’,49 he did not agree that it followed that those powers
were proprietary as distinct from political powers.50 Furthermore, despite
acknowledging that the ‘nation obtained its patrimony by sales and
dedications of land’,51 Brennan J observed that this did not mean ‘that the
patrimony was realised by sales and dedications of land owned absolutely by
be disturbed’: per Brennan J in Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 47. The author has shown
elsewhere that the two limbs of radical title (ie, the ‘concomitant of sovereignty’ limb and
the ‘postulate of the doctrine of tenure’ limb), whether in their application per se or in
conjunction with one another, do not, without more, invest the Crown with beneficial
ownership of any land: Secher, above n 3, Chs 3, 4 and 5. See also Secher, ‘Part 1’, above
n 4 and ‘Part 2’, above n 4, where the author explains that, contrary to the received view,
cases decided in other colonial jurisdictions before Mabo which had recognised the Crown’s
‘radical title’ are not authority for the proposition that the Crown has a present proprietary
estate underlying any aboriginal title, nor the proposition that the Crown’s radical title is
necessarily a full and present proprietary estate in respect of land not subject to pre-existing
rights.
45 The other basis for ownership asserted by the defendant was the ‘no other proprietor’ basis:
see n 56 below. Although Brennan J concluded that none of the grounds advanced for
attributing to the Crown universal and absolute ownership of colonial land were acceptable
(at CLR 54), his treatment of the ‘no other proprietor’ principle was clearly confined to land
which was unoccupied at settlement: see text accompanying n 56 below and Secher, above
n 3, Ch 4, p 190.
46 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 53 citing Williams v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913) 16 CLR 453
at 456.
47 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 54.
48 Ibid, at CLR 52–3.
49 Ibid, at CLR 52, citing R v Symonds [1847] NZPCC 387 at 395.
50 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 52.
51 Ibid, at CLR 52–3 (emphasis added).
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the Crown’.52 Brennan J clarified that what the Crown acquired was ‘a radical
title to land and a sovereign political power over land, the sum of which is not
tantamount to absolute ownership of land’.53
In addition to the above aspects of Brennan J’s judgment which clearly
support an interpretation of radical title as no more than a bare legal title to
land, Brennan J adopted the Privy Council’s treatment of radical title in
Amodu Tijani v Secretary, Southern Nigeria;54 a decision which is authority
for the proposition that there is no necessary equivalence between the Crown’s
radical title and a full beneficial estate.55 Nevertheless, there are four aspects
of Brennan J’s decision which, prima facie, suggest a more generous
interpretation of radical title. Not only does Brennan J suggest that in the case
of unoccupied lands at settlement, the Crown would be the absolute beneficial
owner of the land because ‘there would be no other proprietor’,56 he also
attributes to the Crown an ‘automatic expansion of radical title’ in three other
situations: where native title expires, where native title is surrendered to the
Crown and on the expiration of the term of a lease which has been granted by
the Crown (the ‘reversion expectant’ argument).57
Thus, it was not unequivocally clear whether Brennan J regarded radical
title as a bare title sufficient merely to support the doctrine of tenure and the
Crown’s acquisition of a plenary title, or as conferring full and unfettered
beneficial rights except to the extent of native title.58 However, since the issues
of property in uninhabited unalienated land and residuary rights to land which
has previously been alienated, did not arise directly for determination in
Mabo, Brennan J’s comments in this context are merely obiter. Moreover, the
crucial point is that Brennan J expounded the ‘no other proprietor’ and
‘automatic expansion of radical title’ rationales for attributing absolute
beneficial ownership of land to the Crown in the context of ‘unalienated land’,
that is, land which has not been brought within the regime governed by the
doctrine of tenure or which, having been brought within the tenurial regime by
Crown grant, has ceased to be within it because the relevant Crown grant has
expired. This is important in terms of Brennan J’s articulation of the two limbs
of radical title: although radical title, as a concomitant of sovereignty, enables
the Crown to grant an interest in land, until a tenure is actually created by
Crown grant, radical title does not support the doctrine of tenure or its fictional
explanation. Thus, since the postulate of the doctrine of tenure limb of radical
title only applies to ‘alienated land’, it is not an incident of that limb whereby
the Crown acquires beneficial ownership of land in the four circumstances
suggested by Brennan J.59
52 Ibid, at CLR 53.
53 Id.
54 [1921] 2 AC 399 (PC): ibid, at CLR 49–50 per Brennan J; see also Mabo, above n 6, at CLR
87 per Deane and Gaudron JJ and references to Amodu Tijani by Toohey J at 186, 195, 184.
55 See Secher, ‘Part 1’, above n 4, text accompanying nn 59ff. See also, Secher, above n 3,
Ch 2, esp pp 57–61.
56 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 48. Brennan J was referring to the reason given by Stephen CJ in
Attorney-General (NSW) v Brown (1847) 1 Legge at 317–18. See also above n 37. The
Crown would, therefore, have an allodial title to the land.
57 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 60, 68.
58 Cf Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 48, 50.
59 That is, although radical title is the postulate of the doctrine of tenure, the fiction of original
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The other majority judges in Mabo were also able to redefine the English
doctrine of tenure as a result of their treatment of the origin and meaning of
the concept of radical title. Indeed, like Brennan J, Justice Toohey thought that
the distinction between sovereignty and title to land was crucial when
considering the consequences of the annexation of the Murray Islands.60
Noting that the position of the Crown as the holder of radical title had always
been accepted and was not in issue, Toohey J stressed that what was in issue
was the consequences that flowed from radical title.61 He considered that the
‘blurring of the distinction between sovereignty and title to land’62 obscured
the fact that the acquisition of sovereignty did not necessarily involve
acquisition of title.63 Toohey J explained that the distinction between
sovereignty and title was blurred in English law because the sovereignty of the
Crown over England derived from the feudal notion that the King owned the
land of that country.64 It was the legal fiction ‘that all land was, at one time,
in the possession of the King who had granted some of it to subjects in return
for services’65 that produced the theory of tenures.66 However, Toohey J also
observed that ‘fictions in law are only acknowledged “for some special
purpose”’.67 Thus, because the effect of the fiction of past possession was to
secure the ‘Paramount Lordship or radical title of the Crown which [was]
Crown ownership no longer applies to land which has not been brought within the doctrine
of tenure by appropriate Crown grant (unalienated land, even if unoccupied at settlement).
Indeed, even if this fiction was excluded only in respect of land which is both subject to
pre-existing native title and which has not been brought within the doctrine (unalienated and
occupied land), the effect of the fiction (in the context of unalienated and unoccupied land)
is not to give the Crown title to land: see Part 1, text accompanying nn 104ff, esp n 122. See
also Secher, above n 3, Ch 1, pp 24–5, 32. Furthermore, although Brennan J’s dictum
concerning the Crown’s ‘reversion expectant’ on a lease granted by the Crown suggests that
when previously unalienated land is brought within the regime governed by the doctrine of
tenure by the Crown grant of a lease, the effect of the fiction of original Crown ownership
is to confer a beneficial reversionary interest, this argument was rejected by the High Court,
in the context of the statutory grant of a pastoral lease, in Wik, above n 22. See text
accompanying nn 189ff below and see Secher, above n 3, Ch 4, pp 215ff. Although radical
title as ‘a concomitant of sovereignty’ confers power on the Crown to grant unalienated land
in every part of Australia (whether occupied or unoccupied) so that the doctrine of tenure
(with radical title as its ‘postulate’) may apply to that land, the author has shown elsewhere
that the ‘concomitant of sovereignty’ limb of radical title, whether in its application per se
or in conjunction with the ‘postulate of the doctrine of tenure’ limb of radical title, does not,
without more, invest the Crown with beneficial ownership of any land: see above n 44.
60 His Honour observed that the distinction between sovereignty and title to land is that ‘[the]
former is mainly a matter of jurisdiction, involving questions of international and
constitutional law, whereas the latter is a matter of proprietary rights, which depend for the
most part on the municipal law of property. Moreover, acquisition of one by the Crown
would not necessarily involve acquisition of the other’:Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 180, citing
McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, above n 1, p 108.
61 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 180.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Ibid, at CLR 212.
66 Id.
67 Id, citing Needler v Bishop of Winchester (1614) Hob 220 at 222; 80 ER 367 at 369; Mostyn
v Fabrigas (1774) 1 Cowp 161 at 177; 98 ER 1021 at 1030; Anon, Considerations on the
Law of Forfeitures for High Treason, 4th ed, 1775, pp 64–5: cited by McNeil, Common Law
Aboriginal Title, above n 1, p 84.
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necessary for the operation of [the doctrine of tenure]’,68 the fiction should be
given no wider application than is necessary for the doctrine to operate.69
For Toohey J, therefore, there was no foundation for concluding that by
annexation the Crown acquired a proprietary title or freehold possession of
occupied land in Australia. It acquired a radical title only.70 Since the
acquisition of sovereignty was effected, at common law, by the acquisition by
the Crown of radical title, Toohey J observed that no more was required, and,
with respect to occupied land, no more was possible.71 Accordingly, the
Crown did not acquire a proprietary title to any territory which was in fact
inhabited. As a result of Toohey J’s recognition of interests in land which do
not owe their existence to a Crown grant, therefore, so far as the doctrine of
tenure is concerned, the fiction of original Crown ownership required no more
than to enable the Crown to become Paramount Lord of all who hold a tenure
granted by the Crown. On this approach, although the fiction that land was
originally owned by the Crown still operates in Australia, it does so in a
limited way: it applies only to land that has, in fact, been granted or alienated
by the Crown;72 it does not apply to land which remains unalienated by the
Crown. Although Toohey J’s conclusion is not as explicit as Brennan J’s, the
result is the same: the Australian doctrine of tenure applies to every Crown
grant of an interest in land, but not to rights and interests which do not owe
their existence to a Crown grant.73
Thus, like Brennan J, Toohey J’s judgment supports the proposition that, as
a postulate of the doctrine of tenure, radical title does not confer an automatic
beneficial entitlement to the land to which it relates. Although it enables the
Crown to become Paramount Lord of all who hold a tenure created by Crown
grant, it is not required to support the doctrine of tenure unless the Crown has
exercised its sovereign power to grant an interest in land. Nevertheless,
Toohey J’s obiter comment that ‘[t]he Crown did not acquire a proprietary title
to any territory except that truly uninhabited’,74 suggests a more generous
interpretation of radical title; namely, as conferring full beneficial ownership
except to the extent of native title. This dictum is, however, analogous to
Brennan J’s suggestion that the Crown acquired absolute beneficial ownership
of all unoccupied land because there was ‘no other proprietor’. Both dicta
refer to unalienated land and both Justices have made it clear that the postulate
of the doctrine of tenure limb of radical title is irrelevant to the question of
beneficial ownership of unalienated land.75
68 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 212.
69 Id. Cf S Hepburn, ‘Disinterested Truth: Legitimation of the Doctrine of Tenure Post-Mabo’
(2005) 29(1) MULR 39, text accompanying n 121.
70 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 182, 211.
71 Ibid, at CLR 182.
72 Ibid, at CLR 48 per Brennan J.
73 Ibid, at CLR 48–9 per Brennan J. Thus, Toohey J observed (at 182) that: ‘[i]mmediately on
acquisition [of sovereignty] indigenous inhabitants became British subjects whose interests
were to be protected in the case of a settled colony by the immediate operation of the
[modified] common law’. Toohey J did in fact adopt Brennan J’s reasoning relating to both
the postulate of doctrine of tenure and concomitant of sovereignty limbs of radical title in
Wik, above n 22, at CLR 127.
74 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 182 (emphasis added). See also 211–12.
75 See also above n 44.
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Although Toohey J’s conclusion on the Australian doctrine of tenure was
sufficient to dispose of the defendant’s arguments,76 Toohey J nevertheless
considered what the legal position would be if the English (and thus feudal)
doctrine of tenure applied; that is, if the Crown was deemed to have acquired
full beneficial ownership rather than a mere radical title upon acquisition of
sovereignty. He indicated that if the fictitious possession of all land by the
Crown was to be applied, it may be that it could not operate without also
according fictitious lost grants to the present possessors. This would protect
people in possession of land where no grant had been made, as the grant
would be deemed in law to have been made.77 Indeed, in this context,
Toohey J adopted Kent McNeil’s ‘common law Aboriginal title’ theory.78
Nevertheless, since this theory is inconsistent with the judgments of the other
members of the majority in Mabo, it does not represent the law.79
Significantly, both Brennan and Toohey JJ’s analysis of ‘radical title’ as a
postulate of the Australian doctrine of tenure has the consequence that native
title is sourced outside the doctrine of tenure. Although recognition of native
title is a result of the Australian common law doctrine of tenure which applied
upon settlement of Australia, native title is neither a ‘common law tenure’,80
nor an institution of the common law. Rather, native title exists independently
of the doctrine of tenure: indeed, its existence is possible only because of the
limited role of the doctrine of tenure in Australia.81 Although Deane and
Gaudron JJ also viewed the recognition of native title as a consequence of the
received doctrine of tenure, which is different from the English version, their
conception of the Australian doctrine of tenure, while narrower than the
English doctrine, is nevertheless broader than Brennan and Toohey JJ’s.
Like the other members of the majority, Justices Deane and Gaudron
recognised that the ‘basic tenet’ of English common law principles relating to
real property is that all land was owned by the Crown.82 Noting that by 1788
the practical effect of the doctrine of tenure was confined to the Crown’s
ownership of escheat and forfeiture rights, their Honours nevertheless
emphasised that:
76 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 211.
77 Ibid, at CLR 212.
78 See above n 1.
79 B Edgeworth, ‘Tenure, Allodialism and Indigenous Rights at Common Law: English, United
States and Australian Land Law Compared after Mabo v Queensland’ (1994) 23(4)
Anglo-American L Rev 397 at 422. Edgeworth has also pointed out that Toohey J’s
conclusion that dealings between the Crown and Aborigines give rise to a fiduciary duty on
the part of the Crown is ‘at odds with the English concept of tenure: the Crown as Lord
Paramount in England has absolute title to the land untrammelled by general fiduciary duties
to a group or groups of subjects’: ibid, at 420–2.
80 Indeed, Brennan J (Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 61) expressly stated that native title is not a
‘common law tenure’. See also Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96; 156 ALR
721; 72 ALJR 1442 at [46] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and
Callinan JJ citing Brennan J: ‘Native title is neither an institution of the common law nor a
form of common law tenure but it is recognised by the common law’.
81 The Australian doctrine of tenure and native title are not, however, mutually exclusive
because of the concept of co-existence: see text accompanying n 189 below and Secher,
above n 3, Part 2 of Ch 4.
82 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 80.
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the underlying thesis of the English law of real property remained that the radical
title to (or ultimate ownership of) all land was in the Crown and that the maximum
interest which a subject could have in the land was ownership not of the land itself
but of an estate in fee in it.83
They did not, however, consider that the existence of radical title in the Crown
precluded the ‘preservation and protection, by domestic law of the new
Colony, of any traditional native interests in land’ existing under native law or
custom at the time the Colony was established.84
For Deane and Gaudron JJ, the consequence of radical title to all land in
Australia vesting in the Crown was that:
If there were lands . . . to which no pre-existing native interest existed, the radical
title of the Crown carried with it a full and unfettered proprietary estate. Put
differently, the radical title and the legal and beneficial estate were undivided and
vested in the Crown. . . . On the other hand, if there were lands . . . in relation to
which there was some pre-existing native interest, the effect . . . would not be to
preclude the vesting of radical title in the Crown. It would be to reduce, qualify, or
burden the proprietary estate in land which would otherwise have vested in the
Crown, to the extent which was necessary to recognise and protect the pre-existing
native interest.85
Although Deane and Gaudron JJ adopt the view that, upon settlement,
radical title confers rights of beneficial ownership except to the extent of
native title, their Honours’ acknowledge, in conformity with the other
members of the majority, that there is a distinction between radical title and
beneficial title and that the practical effect of the vesting of radical title in the
Crown ‘was merely to enable the English system of private ownership of
estates held of the Crown to be observed in the Colony’.86
Deane and Gaudron JJ’s departure from the reasoning of the other majority
justices begins with their explanation of the rationale underlying the
Australian doctrine of tenure. Rather than focusing on the distinction between
sovereignty and title to land as Brennan and Toohey JJ did, they emphasised
a strong common law assumption that the act of State establishing a new
colony did not extinguish the pre-existing native interests in lands in the
colony but that such interests were preserved and protected by the domestic
law of the colony after its establishment.87 The effect of this assumption was
not ‘to preclude the vesting of radical title in the Crown’88 but was to ‘reduce,
qualify or burden the proprietary estate in land which would otherwise have
vested in the Crown, to the extent necessary to recognise and protect the
pre-existing native interest’.89
Thus, rather than concluding that the Australian doctrine of tenure does not
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Ibid, at CLR 86–7.
86 Ibid, at CLR 81.
87 Ibid, at CLR 82.
88 Ibid, at CLR 86.
89 Ibid, at CLR 86–7. Their Honours also noted (at 102–4) that the four Australian cases which
supported the proposition that the legal and beneficial ownership of all land in the colony
had vested in the Crown did not involve the question of Aboriginal entitlement to land. Thus,
although the Justices conceded that the authority which these cases lent to the proposition
was formidable, they dismissed the relevant comments as obiter dicta: at 104.
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apply to rights and interests in land which do not owe their existence to a
Crown grant, as Brennan and Toohey JJ do, Deane and Gaudron JJ suggest
that the doctrine of tenure applies, prima facie, to all land in Australia but
yields to a specific common law assumption vis-a`-vis native title. According
to this analysis, native title appears to be no more than another exception to
the doctrine of tenure as understood in English law. However, since the
justices do not refer to any deemed grant in favour of native title holders in
these circumstances, it appears that native title is analogous to the allodial title
exception to the doctrine of tenure: a true exception rather than a circumstance
giving rise to a deemed grant.90
A significant implication of such an interpretation is that native title is
sourced within the common law and is thus a creature of the common law
rather than merely being recognised by it. Indeed, Deane and Gaudron JJ use
the term ‘common law aboriginal title’ to designate respected and protected
pre-existing native interests.91 Nevertheless, like the other majority justices,
Deane and Gaudron JJ distinguish between the radical title to and the
beneficial ownership of land in circumstances where the relevant assumption
applies. Consequently, they too redefine the doctrine of tenure that was
received as part of the law of the Australian colonies upon settlement. Deane
and Gaudron JJ’s redefinition is not, however, as narrow as Brennan and
Toohey JJ’s redefinition.92
Although it appears that Deane and Gaudron JJ attribute beneficial
ownership of unalienated and unoccupied land to the Crown as an incident of
the postulate of the doctrine of tenure limb of radical title, their judgment is
equivocal. Having acknowledged that the practical effect of radical title being
90 See Part 1, text accompanying nn 129ff. See also, Secher, above n 3, Ch 1, pp 26–7, 32.
91 For example, see Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 86. Furthermore, they conclude (at 87) that the
recognition and protection of a pre-existing native title interest ‘of a kind unknown to the
English law’ requires ‘either a transformation of the interest into a kind known to the
common law or a modification of the common law to accommodate the new kind of
interest’.
92 Although Deane and Gaudron JJ’s modified doctrine of tenure does not go as far as Brennan
and Toohey JJ’s, their approach is not as restrictive as that of the dissenting judgment of
Dawson J, which reflects a different understanding of the effect of annexation at common
law. His Honour agreed (Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 162) with the majority judges that the
acquisition of radical title (‘though not actual possession of’ all the land) by the Crown was
a necessary consequence of the exertion of sovereignty, and that this result stemmed from
the system of law which the Crown brought with it: at 122. Dawson J’s departure from the
majority, however, begins with his universal application of the doctrine of tenure. His
Honour observed that according to the common law that the Crown brought with it, land was
not the subject of absolute ownership other than by the Crown. Although noting that this
notion is of ‘historical rather than practical interest’ for most purposes, Dawson J considered
it fundamental in any consideration of the acquisition of territory: at 122. His Honour was
therefore compelled to conclude that ‘upon annexation of the Murray Islands the Crown
became the absolute owner of the land and such rights as others might have in it must be
derived from the Crown and amount to something less than absolute ownership’: at 122. For
Dawson J, therefore, annexation brought with it a radical title which amounted to an
absolute title. And, since any interest in land must derive from the Crown, any pre-existing
native title would require some act of executive or legislative recognition by the Crown to
continue. As a result of his Honour’s examination of North American, African and New
Zealand authorities, Dawson J found that, as a matter of general legal principle, the native
inhabitants of those places held title only of the Crown.
154 (2006) 13 Australian Property Law Journal
vested in the Crown is to enable the Crown to become Paramount Lord of all
who hold a tenure created by Crown grant, their conclusion in respect of land
that has not been brought within the doctrine of tenure and is not, therefore,
held of the Crown, unnecessarily perpetuates the fiction of absolute Crown
ownership upon settlement. Mere radical title, as a bare legal title, a power to
create interests in land, is sufficient to invest the Crown with the character of
Paramount Lord in respect of a tenure created by grant. Alternatively, if Deane
and Gaudron JJ’s suggestion that radical title carried with it a full and
unfettered proprietary estate where land was not subject to some pre-existing
native interest is correct, then their Honours’ observation that it was
‘conceivably’ the whole of the lands of Australia that were affected by native
title,93 would deny automatic acquisition of beneficial ownership of any land
in Australia upon settlement.
B Summary and implications for Aboriginal rights to land
Each substantive judgment in Mabo deals with the question of the effect of
annexation upon the feudal basis of land law differently. Nevertheless, all
majority judges viewed the recognition of native title as a consequence of the
Australian doctrine of tenure which was received as part of the law of the
Australian colonies upon settlement. Mason CJ and McHugh J agreed with
Brennan J that the operation of the Australian doctrine of tenure was limited
to land that had been granted by the Crown. The tenor of Toohey J’s judgment
appears to support Brennan J’s approach.94 While Deane and Gaudron JJ
appear to suggest that the doctrine of tenure applies universally in Australia,95
they conclude that the Australian doctrine of tenure is subject to a common
law assumption in favour of native title holders.
Essentially, therefore, all the majority justices agreed that the doctrine of
tenure, which applied upon settlement of Australia, is different from the
English feudal counterpart: the Australian doctrine of tenure does not apply
automatically to all land. The main point of divergence between the majority
justices relates to the extent to which this Australian doctrine of tenure applies
to land which has not been granted by the Crown. Nevertheless, all the
majority justices were able to redefine the doctrine of tenure because they
drew a distinction between the title to land which the Crown acquires upon
acquisition of sovereignty, and the rights to the use and benefit of that land
which might be vested in some person or entity other than the Crown.96 As a
result, the orthodox assumption that sovereignty conferred on the Crown not
only radical title to, but also absolute beneficial ownership of, all land was
rejected: the majority held that the Crown acquired only a radical title to all
land.97
93 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 101. However, their Honours considered it ‘unnecessary for the
purposes of [their] judgment, and probably now impracticable, to seek to ascertain what
proportion of the lands of the continent were affected by such common law native title’: id.
94 Toohey J’s consideration of whether the doctrine of tenure created a tenurial relationship
between the Crown and the indigenous occupiers was merely obiter.
95 And, thus, prima facie appear to agree with Dawson J, see above n 92.
96 Thus, the majority distinguished between Crown title to colonies and Crown ownership of
land.
97 For almost 150 years Australian courts had held that on acquisition of sovereignty over the
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The separation of radical title to, and beneficial ownership of, land thus
allows the doctrine of tenure, whether based on a narrow or a broad
interpretation, to apply to land in Australia without precluding the existence of
interests in or over land, such as native title, that do not owe their existence
to a Crown grant. Thus, the Crown’s radical title, as a postulate of the doctrine
of tenure, simply enabled the English doctrine of tenure to be applied in
colonial Australia. Significantly, however, four members of the majority agree
that the modified doctrine of tenure, and its subsequent recognition of land
title, applies only to land that has been granted or alienated by the Crown.98
This conclusion represents a fundamental departure from the English doctrine
of tenure: the two-fold feudal fiction underlying the English doctrine of tenure
no longer applies in the Australian context; instead, the ‘fiction of original
Crown ownership of land which has actually been granted by the Crown’
applies.
What is, therefore, the effect of the High Court’s restatement of the common
law doctrine of tenure on the legal status of unalienated land; land in respect
of which the Crown does not have Paramount Lordship? That is, what are the
Crown’s rights in relation to land which has neither been brought within the
doctrine of tenure by Crown grant of an interest in the land nor appropriated
to the Crown such that the Crown has acquired a plenary title to the land
where the land is not subject to judicially recognised and, thus, enforceable
native title (unalienated land not subject to native title)?99 By suggesting, in
Mabo, that the Crown must be the absolute beneficial owner of unoccupied
and unalienated lands because there is ‘no other proprietor’, Brennan J, with
whom Mason CJ and McHugh JJ concurred, recognised that not all
unalienated land in Australia is subject to native title. The land is unoccupied
because neither the Crown nor Aboriginal people (in their capacity as native
title holders) occupy it.100 However, if there is a legal explanation to the
question of property rights in unalienated and unoccupied land, there is no
Australian colonies, the Crown acquired absolute beneficial ownership of ‘every square
inch’ of land: Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 at 245 per Blackburn J;
[1972-73] ALR 65. His Honour was referring to Attorney-General v Brown (1847) 1 Legge
312; 2 SCR (NSW) (App) 30; Williams v Attorney-General for New South Wales (1913) 16
CLR 404 and Council of the Municipality of Randwick v Rutledge (1959) 102 CLR 54;
[1960] ALR 66. In none of these cases except Milirrpum, however, did the issue of the
Crown’s title arise in a context not involving claims by aboriginal people.
98 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 48 per Brennan J.
99 Although this article focuses on the ‘postulate of the doctrine of tenure’ limb of radical title,
the issue of the juridical nature of the Crown’s radical title requires consideration of both
limbs of radical title before it can be conclusively determined: see above n 44.
100 In the context of the feudal doctrine of tenure, see Saddler’s Case (1588) 4 Co R 54b
at 58a–58b; 76 ER 1019–20:
this difference was taken and agreed; when the King’s tenant dies in possession without
heir, so that in such case possessio est vacua, and in nobody, there the law will adjudge
the King (in whom no laches shall be reckoned) in actual possession immediately; but
when another is in seisin and possession at the time of the escheat so that possess ‘plena
est et non vac’, there the King shall not be adjudged in possession till this seisin and
possession is removed, as if the King’s tenant is disseised and dies without heir; or if an
alien born, or the King’s villein, or the alienee in mortmain is disseised, and all this is
by office, in these cases the King shall not be in possession till the possession and seisin
of the terre-tenant is removed . . ..
This issue is further explored by Secher, above n 3, Ch 7.
156 (2006) 13 Australian Property Law Journal
need to resort to a new legal fiction: the ‘no other proprietor’ fiction. Indeed,
the High Court has not had the opportunity to authoritatively determine this
issue.
Although, pre-Mabo, acquisition of title by occupancy was severely
restricted by the fiction that all lands were originally possessed, and
accordingly, owned, by the Crown,101 since Mabo, this fiction only applies in
respect of a tenure created by Crown grant.102 Accordingly, the fiction of
original Crown ownership, or any rule dependent upon it, can no longer, of
itself, exclude acquisition of first title to unalienated and uninhabited real
property in Australia.103 There is, therefore, the potential to accommodate
sources of title in addition to Crown grant or native title within Australian land
law post-Mabo.
Indeed, as shown in Part 1, the feudal theory that all lands are held
mediately or immediately of the Crown was always tempered by a number of
antithetical factors. In addition to the possible acquisition of title by virtue of
occupancy of a vacant pur autre vie estate, was the existence of allodial land
and the acquisition of land rights by adverse possession and by virtue of
customary law predating the tenurial scheme.104 The crucial point is that these
‘exceptions’ to strict feudal theory can now be accommodated within
Australian land law as redefined by the High Court. Although radical title
secures the Crown as one source of derivative title to land, it does not preclude
the existence of interests in land that do not derive from Crown grant.
This has significant implications for Aboriginal people occupying
unalienated land, whether such occupation satisfies the definition of native
title105 (and, thus, confers native title rights) or not. Indeed, although it is clear
that unalienated land is capable of supporting a native title application, native
title is not an institution of the common law.106 Nevertheless, native title is
currently the only non-Crown derived title recognised by Australian courts
which may burden the Crown’s radical title. The High Court’s restatement of
the Australian doctrine of tenure, however, provides a further basis for rights
as against the Crown to unalienated lands occupied by Aboriginal people: a
basis upon which Aboriginal customary law can be a valid source of common
101 See McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, above n 1, p 11 and authorities cited in n 19.
See also comments by Stephen CJ in Hatfield v Alford (1846) 1 Legge 330 at 337.
102 See text accompanying nn 22ff above.
103 See Secher, above n 3, Ch 7.
104 See Part 1, text immediately following n 26. See also Secher, above n 3, Ch 1, esp pp 26–33.
105 Cf Hepburn, above n 69, esp text accompanying n 110 and ‘Feudal Tenure and Native Title:
Revising an Enduring Fiction’ (2005) 27 SydLR 49, where the author argues that, in order to
promote a pluralist property culture, the complete abolition of the feudal doctrine of tenure
and its replacement with an allodial system of landholding is necessary.
106 Indeed, the unique status of native title in terms of its vulnerability to extinguishment flows
from the fact that it is not an institution of the common law: the High Court has, by
implication, made it clear that the rule that the Crown cannot take or grant but by record
does not apply to native title holders. Although native title holders are in possession before
the Crown, the Crown has the power to unilaterally extinguish native title rights by
inconsistent grant per se: see U Secher, ‘The Reception of Land Law into the Australian
Colonies Post-Mabo: The Continuity and Recognition Doctrines Revisited and the
Emergence of the Doctrine of ‘Continuity Pro-Tempore’ (2004) 27(3) UNSWLJ 703, text
accompanying nn 123ff.
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law title to land and thus an alternative to native title.107
Because native title does not originate in English property law, it remains
an autonomous body of law that is merely accorded recognition by the
common law where a continuing relationship with the land can be proven.108
That is, ‘the common law recognises a set of rights coming from Aboriginal
law’, but ‘anglo-Australian law does not recognise Aboriginal law as law. It is
recognised merely as a fact, to be proved as to its existence and content by
evidence’.109 However, recognition of a common law Aboriginal title
107 That is, in addition to possible native title rights, Aboriginal people would be able to
establish title to land upon proof that they have a title by virtue of their own customary laws
whether the existence of such title arose before or after acquisition of sovereignty: for a
detailed examination of customary law as a source of non-derivative common law title to
land, see Secher, above n 3, Ch 9, pp 514ff. Although the ‘ownership by custom’ basis was
advanced in Mabo as an alternative argument to support the rights and interests of the
plaintiffs to their traditional land, as a result of the High Court’s finding that native title
survived the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty, this argument was not examined.
Furthermore, although the High Court in Fejo v Northern Territory, above n 80, rejected an
argument that native title was analogous to rights recognised in English land law like rights
of common or customary rights, the court only distinguished common law rights which find
their origins in actual or presumed grant; the court failed to address common law rights
which have their origins in custom and therefore exist independently of any such grant. That
is, the High Court failed to make a critical threefold distinction between i) incorporeal
hereditaments proper, for example easements, ii) customary rights in the nature of
incorporeal hereditaments and iii) customary rights predating sovereignty: see Secher, above
n 3, Ch 9, pp 516ff.
108 The common law definition of native title has been codified in s 223(1) of the Native Title
Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA). The legislative definition refers to ‘the rights and interests . . .
possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed by
the [indigenous claimants]’: s 223(1)(a). As a result of the High Court’s decision inMembers
of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422; 194 ALR 538, the
meaning of ‘traditional’ for the purposes of s 223(1)(a) of the NTA has been narrowly
defined by Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [56]–[47]:
‘traditional” is a word apt to refer to a means of transmission of law or custom.
A traditional law or custom is one which has been passed from generation to generation
of a society, usually by word of mouth and common practice. But in the context of the
Native Title Act, ‘traditional’ carries with it two other elements in its meaning. First, it
conveys an understanding of the age of the traditions: the origins of the content of the law
or custom concerned are to be found in the normative rules of the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander societies that existed before the assertion of sovereignty by the British
Crown. It is only those normative rules that are ‘traditional’ laws and customs. Secondly,
and no less importantly, the reference to rights or interests in land or waters being
possessed under traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed by the
peoples concerned, requires that the normative system under which the rights and
interests are possessed (the traditional laws and customs) is a system that has had a
continuous existence and vitality since sovereignty. If that normative system has not
existed throughout that period, the rights and interests which owe their existence to that
system will have ceased to exist. And any later attempt to revive adherence to the tenets
of that former system cannot and will not reconstitute the traditional laws and customs
out of which rights and interests must spring if they are to fall within the definition of
native title.
See also n 112 below.
109 V Kerruish and J Purdy, ‘He “Look” Honest — Big White Thief’ (1998) 4(1) Law Text
Culture: Special Edition ‘In the Wake of Terra Nullius’ 146 at 153. This point has been
expressed in clear terms by the High Court in Fejo, above n 80, at [46] per Gleeson CJ,
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ: Native title has its origins in the
traditional laws acknowledged and the customs observed by the indigenous people who
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(Mark II)110 based upon Aboriginal people’s own customary systems of law
has the consequence that customary law is adopted directly into the
substantive law of Australia.111 Accordingly, although a particular native title
claim to land or water may not be supported, a customary land law claim to
the same land or water may be.
Indeed, Moynihan J’s conclusion, in Mabo v Queensland (No 1),112 that the
plaintiffs’ claim to seas and reefs was not supported by the evidence and in
fact their rights to these areas had in fact been lost because rights must be
exercised to keep them alive provides a useful example. As Dr Amankwah has
observed, ‘it is possible for a people to abandon their land if the abandonment
is accompanied by animus diserandi et relinquandi; but their custom does not
vanish until the people . . . become extinct’.113 Thus, although proof that a
traditional connection with land has been substantially maintained is essential
in the context of a native title claim,114 the concept of continuous connection
with land may be avoided in the context of a customary title claim. That is,
another legal right, that of ‘Aboriginal customary law title holder’, is available
to Aboriginal people as a result of the Australian doctrine of tenure.
It will be seen in the next section, however, that the applicability of the
redefined doctrine of tenure and its supporting postulate, radical title, was only
possible because the High Court rejected the common law concept of ‘desert
and uncultivated’115 territory for the purpose of the common law doctrine of
reception.
possess the native title (citing Brennan J in Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 58). Native title is
neither an institution of the common law nor a form of common law tenure but it is
recognised by the common law (citing Brennan J in Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 59–61). There
is, therefore, an intersection of traditional laws and customs with the common law. The
underlying existence of the traditional laws and customs is a necessary pre-requisite for
native title but their existence is not a sufficient basis for recognising native title.
110 ‘Common Law Aboriginal Title Mark II’ is used to describe the author’s conception of
Aboriginal customary law as a source of non-derivative common law title to land in order
to distinguish it from the concept of ‘Common Law Aboriginal Title’ originally developed
by McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, above n 1.
111 See Secher, above n 3, Ch 9.
112 (1988) 166 CLR 186; 83 ALR 14. See also the High Court’s decision in Members of the
Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422; 194 ALR 538 and above
n 108.
113 H A Amankwah, ‘Post-Mabo: The Prospect of the Recognition of a Regime of Customary
(Indigenous) Law in Australia’ (1994) 18(1) UQLJ 15 at 32.
114 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 59–60 per Brennan J; Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR
483 at 500, 544 per Lee J.
115 Blackstone uses this term: Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England: Of the
Rights of Persons, A Facsimile of the First Edition, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1979, p 104; 15th ed, Reprint, Professional Books Limited, Oxon, England, 1982,
p 107. After citing the relevant passage from Blackstone, Brennan J adopts the phrase ‘desert
uninhabited’: Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 35.
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3 The reception of land law into the Australian
colonies revisited
A Constitutional status of Australia: An ‘inhabited’
settled colony116
It was explained in Part 1 that although the manner in which a sovereign
acquires a new territory is a matter of international law, the system of law
applicable in a newly-acquired territory is determined by the common law.117
Thus, the doctrine of terra nullius is relevant at international law in deciding
whether a State has acquired sovereignty by purported occupation,118 but it is
not relevant at common law in determining the law which is to govern the new
possession.119 The doctrine of terra nullius is, however, broadly analogous to
the common law concept of colonial acquisition by ‘settlement’ of a ‘desert
and uncultivated’120 country pursuant to which the common law of England
became the law of the colony in so far as it was applicable to colonial
conditions.121
Until Mabo, therefore, when sovereignty of a territory was acquired under
the enlarged notion of terra nullius for the purpose of international law, that
116 This section is adapted from Part III of the author’s article: U Secher, ‘The Reception of
Land Law into the Australian Colonies Post-Mabo: The Continuity and Recognition
Doctrines Revisited and the Emergence of the Doctrine of ‘Continuity Pro-Tempore’ (2004)
27(3) UNSWLJ 703. This article also examines the status of the ‘continuity’ and
‘recognition’ doctrines in Australia post-Mabo and the distinction between the scope of the
Crown’s prerogative powers in inhabited settled colonies (like Australia), on the one hand,
and in conquered or ceded colonies, on the other. Crucially, the author’s argument that, as a
result of the High Court’s restatement of the common law in Mabo, there is a new doctrine
prescribing the system of law that applies upon settlement of an inhabited territory:
a modified doctrine of reception, which includes the doctrine of continuity pro tempore
(a merged version of the continuity and recognition doctrines), has been cited with approval
by the Federal Court: Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457; 218 ALR 292
at [121].
117 See Part 3, section headed ‘The Reception of Land Law into the Australian Colonies’, text
accompanying nn 169ff. See also Secher, above n 3, Ch 1, esp pp 35–9.
118 The Commonwealth Government acknowledged this in its written response to the Draft
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1989, stating that ‘[t]erra
nullius is a concept of public international law; it would be inappropriate to use it in the
context of domestic land claims’: cited by G Simpson, ‘Mabo, International Law, Terra
Nullius and the Stories of Settlement: An Unresolved Jurisprudence’ (1993) 19 MULR 195
at 210.
119 Sir Harry Gibbs, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, has observed that the
‘expression “terra nullius” seems to have been unknown to the common law. I have found
no trace of it in legal dictionaries ranging from Cowel’s Interpreter (1701 ed) to Strouds
Judicial Dictionary (1986 ed). It is not mentioned in Tarring’s Law Relating to the Colonies
(1913 ed) which in its day was regarded as authorative’: Foreward in M A Stepenson and
S Ratnapala (Eds), Mabo: A Judicial Revolution — The Aboriginal Land Rights Decision
and Its Impact on Australian Law, University of Queensland Press, Queensland, 1993, p xiv.
120 See Part 1, text accompanying nn 193ff. See also Secher, above n 3, Ch 1, pp 37–9.
121 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 35 per Brennan J; Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of
England, above n 115, A Facsimile of the First Edition, pp 104–5; 15th ed, p 107; accord
Forbes v Cochrane (1824) 2 B & C 448 at 463; 107 ER 450 at 456. English law would
become the law of a territory outside England either upon first settlement by English
colonists of a ‘desert and uncultivated’ country or by the exercise of the Sovereign’s
legislative power over a conquered or ceded territory.
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territory was treated as ‘desert and uncultivated’ country for the purpose of the
common law because there was an absence of ‘settled inhabitants’ and ‘settled
law’.122 According to pre-Mabo orthodoxy, if an inhabited territory was terra
nullius for the purpose of acquisition of sovereignty, it was assumed that there
could be no sufficiently organised system of native law and tenure to admit of
recognition by the common law. In such circumstances, since the indigenous
inhabitants and their occupancy of land were ignored when considering title
to land in the settled colony, the Crown’s sovereignty over the territory was
equated with Crown ownership of the lands therein because there was ‘no
other proprietor of such lands’.123Accordingly, the classification of territory as
‘desert and uncultivated’ has been a basis for attributing absolute beneficial
ownership of all land in Australia in the Crown. In this respect, therefore, the
‘occupation of’ and the ‘settlement of’ an inhabited territory were equated
with the ‘occupation of’ and the ‘settlement of’ an uninhabited territory for the
purpose of legitimising the acquisition of sovereignty in international law and
in ascertaining the law of the territory on colonisation at common law
respectively.124
In Mabo, it was conceded by all parties and accepted by the court that the
Crown had acquired sovereignty of Australia by occupancy under
international law. Furthermore, all members of the High Court concluded that,
at common law, irrespective of the original presence of the Aboriginal
inhabitants, Australia was a territory acquired by settlement.125 Accordingly,
the question before the court was whether or not native title was part of the
common law of a settled territory.126 However, notwithstanding that the
classification of inhabited territory as uninhabited for legal purposes served
different functions in international law and at common law, in rejecting the
proposition that the common law of a settled colony did not recognise native
title, one of the most contentious aspects of the High Court’s decision has been
122 Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cas at 291 per Lord Watson.
123 Attorney-General v Brown (1847) Legge 312 at 319 per Stephen CJ; also cited in Mabo,
above n 6, at CLR 40 per Brennan J.
124 ‘Occupation’ and ‘settlement’ are used interchangeably in respect of both the common law
and the international law doctrines relating to the classification of inhabited land as
uninhabited. However, and notwithstanding that the term ‘settlement’ has often been
preferred by Australian judges and writers when referring to the international law method of
acquisition known as ‘occupation’ (see, eg, Coe v Commonwealth (1979) 24 ALR 118 at 129
per Gibbs J), as the common law term is ‘settlement’ (see Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 33 per
Brennan J, Mason CJ and McHugh J concurring), ‘occupation’ will be employed to refer to
the international law doctrine.
125 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 37–8, 57 per Brennan J; 79–80 per Deane and Gaudron JJ; 182 per
Toohey J; 138–9 per Dawson J. Terra nullius was not mentioned in any of the plaintiffs’
submissions, and was not referred to at all during the four days of substantive argument
before the High Court of Australia: High Court of Australia: Transcript of Proceedings,
Mabo v Queensland, 28–31 May 1991. It is also worth noting at this juncture that a proposal
by the Australian Law Reform Commission to reclassify Australia as ‘conquered’ was not
formally adopted: Australian Law Reform Commission, The Recognition of Aboriginal
Customary Laws, Report No 31, 1986, Vol 1, Ch 5.
126 Counsel for the plaintiffs made it clear that their submissions were not directed towards
arguing that Australia had not been ‘settled’: High Court of Australia: Transcript of
Proceedings, Mabo v Queensland, 28–31 May 1991, at 146. Counsel merely argued that,
irrespective of the mode of acquisition of a colony, native interests inland were preserved as
a burden upon the title of the Crown: ibid, at 3.
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its treatment of the international law doctrine of terra nullius.127
Accepting that Australia was not, in fact, terra nullius in 1788, yet legally
unoccupied for the purpose of acquisition of sovereignty, the High Court
equated occupation of an inhabited territory with occupation of an uninhabited
territory. Sovereignty was, therefore, acquired under the enlarged notion of
terra nullius. Despite this conclusion, however, the majority of the High Court
expressly disapproved of the application of the concept of terra nullius to an
inhabited country and recognised that the notion that inhabited land may be
classed as terra nullius no longer commanded general support in international
law.128 Although the court challenged the classification of Australia as a
127 See, eg, D M Austin, ‘Mabo: Sorting the Fact from Fiction’ (1993) 7(4) CLQ 13 at 15;
M Brabazon, ‘Mabo, The Constitution and the Republic’ (1994) 11 Aust Bar Rev 229 at 232
et seq; F Brennan, ‘Implications for Aborigines and Islanders’ in M A Stephenson and
S Ratnapala (Eds), Mabo: A Judicial Revolution, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia,
Queensland, 1993, p 26; P Butt, ‘Native Land Rights in Australia: The Mabo Case’ (1995)
The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 33 at 34–5; J R S Forbes, ‘Mabo and the Miners —
Ad Infinitum?’ in MA Stephenson (Ed), Mabo: The Native Title Legislation — A Legislative
Response to the High Court’s Decision, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia,
Queensland, 1995, p 51; M Gregory, ‘Rewriting History 1: Mabo v Queensland: The
Decision’ (1992) 17(4) AltLJ 157; B Hocking, ‘Aboriginal Law Does Now Run in Australia’
(1993) 15 SydLR 187 at 188–9; G McGinley, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights:Mabo and Others
v State of Queensland — The Australian High Court Addresses 200 Years of Oppression’
(1993) 21(2) Denver Jnl of Int Law and Policy 311 at 318 et seq; G D Meyers and
J Mugumbwa, ‘TheMabo Decision: Australian Aboriginal Land Rights in Transition’ (1993)
23 Environmental Law 1203 at 1213; K Puri, ‘Mabo — A Legal Revolution?’ in Mabo —
A Critical Review: Proceedings of the University of Queensland TC Bernie School of Law
Annual Symposium, Hilton International Hotel, Brisbane, Friday, 6 November 1992,
University of Queensland, Brisbane, 1992, p 19; H Reynolds, The Law of the Land, Penguin
Books, Victoria, 1992, pp 186, 195–6; G Simpson, ‘Mabo, International Law, Terra Nullius
and the Stories of Settlement: An Unresolved Jurisprudence’ (1993) 19 MULR 195 at 205 et
seq; Cf R H Bartlett, ‘The Mabo Decision’ (1993) APLJ 236 at 241; H Gibbs, ‘Foreward’
in M A Stephenson and S Ratnapala (Eds), Mabo: A Judicial Revolution, University of
Queensland Press, St Lucia, Queensland, 1993, p xiv; G Nettheim, ‘Native Title and
International Law’ in in M A Stephenson (Ed), Mabo: The Native Title Legislation —
A Legislative Response to the High Court’s Decision, University of Queensland Press, St
Lucia, Queensland, 1995, p 37; P O’Connor, ‘Aboriginal Land Rights at Common Law:
Mabo v Queensland’ (1992) 18(2) MonLR 251 at 255; D Ritter, ‘The “Rejection of Terra
Nullius” in Mabo: A Critical Analysis’ (1996) 18(3) SydLR 5; Hepburn, above n 69, and
above n 105.
128 Four of the majority judges expressly relied upon the critical examination of the theory of
terra nullius by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara
(1975) ICJR 12 to reject the doctrine of terra nullius as a basis for the colonial acquisition
of inhabited territories: at 40–1 per Brennan J (with whom Mason CJ and McHugh J
concurred); 141–2 per Toohey J. It was not until 1975 that an international tribunal raised
doubts about the question whether land occupied by indigenous people could be considered
terra nullius: Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara (1975) ICJR 12. Although the separate
opinion of Vice President Ammoun considered that the concept of terra nullius had been
employed at all periods to justify conquest and colonisation and as such stood condemned
(at 86), the majority thought that territory was not terra nullius if it were occupied by people
having ‘social and political organisation’: at 39. The majority view appears to indicate that
territory inhabited by people not having such organisation is terra nullius. Further, the High
Court failed to note that the International Court of Justice actually applied the inter-temporal
rule: see above n 106. ‘The question was whether the territory was terra nullius according
to the international practice of 1884, the date of Spain’s colonisation. . . . The relevant date
was 1884, not 1974 (when the dispute arose) or 1975 (when the court wrote its opinion)’:
R L Sharwood, ‘Aboriginal Land Rights: Further Reflections’ (1995) 93 Victorian Law News
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territory acquired by occupation and, therefore, the legal foundation for the
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, the court’s unanimous view that the
acquisition of sovereignty is not justicable before municipal courts,129
precluded any review of this classification.130 Municipal courts have,
however, jurisdiction to determine the consequences of an acquisition of
sovereignty: thus, it was open to the High Court to determine the body of law
that applied in the newly acquired territory of Australia.
Since the enlarged doctrine of terra nullius had ceased to command
acceptance under international law,131 the court found that its broadly
analogous application in the common law of property was brought into
question. In contradistinction to their conclusion on the issue of acquisition of
sovereignty, the majority refused to follow the ‘orthodox’ approach which
equated the settlement of an inhabited territory with settlement of an
uninhabited territory in ascertaining the law of a territory on colonisation. The
rejection of this approach was, substantially, on three grounds. In addition to
the fact that its analogue in international law no longer commanded general
support,132 the factual premise underpinning the colonial reception of the
common law of England was not only false,133 but also manifestly unjust.134
Thus, and the crucial point is that, although the High Court accepted that
Australia was a settled territory, six justices changed the law that applies to a
colony acquired by settlement where the colony was not previously
uninhabited.135 Under the common law pre-Mabo, the necessary result of the
41 at 45–6. See also D J Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 3rd ed, Sweet
and Maxwell, London, 1983, pp 165–7; N L Wallace-Bruce, ‘Two Hundred Years on:
A Reexamination of the Acquisition of Australia’ (1989) 19 Georgia Jnl of International and
Comparative Law 87 at 88.
129 This principle was stated by Gibbs J in New South Wales v Commonwealth (The Seas and
Submerged Lands case) (1975) 135 CLR 337 at 388; 8 ALR 1 in the following terms: ‘The
acquisition of territory by a sovereign state for the first time is an act of state which cannot
be challenged, controlled or interfered with by the courts of that State’. It precludes ‘any
contest between the executive and the judicial branches of government as to whether a
territory is or is not within the Crown’s dominions’: Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 31 per
Brennan J. See also Post Offıce v Estuary Radio Ltd [1968] 2 QB 740 at 753 per Diplock LJ;
[1967] 3 All ER 663; Wacando v Commonwealth (1981) 148 CLR 1 at 11 per Gibbs J; 21
per Mason J; 37 ALR 317.
130 The court’s approach in relation to this aspect of the case also accords with inter-temporal
law. The inter-temporal rule is an established rule of international law and provides that
where ‘the rights of parties to a dispute derive from legally significant acts . . . very long ago
. . . the situation in question must be appraised . . . in the light of the rules of international
law as they existed at the time, and not as they exist today’: Harris, above n 128, pp 165–7.
In the Island of Palmas Case 2 RIAA 829, the rule was stated thus: ‘judicial fact must be
appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the
time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be determined.’
131 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 41 per Brennan J.
132 Ibid, at CLR 40–1 per Brennan J (relying on the International Court of Justice Advisory
Opinion on Western Sahara (1975) 1 ICJR 12 at 39; 182 per Toohey J.
133 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 17–18, 21–2 per Brennan J; 99–100 per Deane and Gaudron JJ;
182 per Toohey J.
134 Ibid, at CLR 42 per Brennan J; 109 per Deane and Gaudron JJ.
135 Pre-Mabo, however, the common law determining the law which was to govern a new
possession had two limbs, one general and one specific. The general limb consisted of a
doctrine prescribing the law (whether English or local) that applied in the newly-acquired
territory (in the case of settlements, the doctrine of reception). The specific limb consisted
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categorisation of a colony as settled (whether uninhabited in fact or ‘legally
uninhabited’) was that English law, including the feudal doctrine of tenure,
applied ipso jure throughout the colony. However, by ascribing to Australia
the status of a new colony, a settled yet inhabited colony, theMabo High Court
was free to prescribe (and indeed had to prescribe because there was no law
on point) a doctrine relating to the law that applied in the colony: a modified
doctrine of reception. In this context, there were three different approaches
from the six judges: one from Brennan J, one from Deane and Gaudron JJ and
one from Toohey J. Indeed, it will be seen that although Brennan J’s treatment
of the doctrine of reception departs significantly from the received view,
Deane and Gaudron JJ’s more conservative approach accords more with the
conventional view. Toohey J’s treatment of the doctrine of reception is,
however, equivocal. While he examined the effect of the law that applied in
Australia upon settlement, he failed to explain why, in light of the doctrine of
reception, this particular law applied.
For Deane and Gaudron JJ, the fact that New South Wales was validly
established as a ‘settled colony’, meant that so much of the common law of
England as was ‘reasonably applicable to the circumstances of the colony’was
introduced.136Although suggesting that ‘[i]f the slate were clean, there would
be something to be said for the view that the English system of land law was
not, in 1788, appropriate for application to the circumstances of a British penal
colony’,137 their Honours accepted as ‘incontrovertible’ that the common law
applicable upon the establishment of the colony of New South Wales included
that general system of land law.138
Nevertheless, the principle that only so much of the common law was
introduced as was ‘reasonably applicable to the circumstances of the
Colony’,139 ‘left room for the continued operation of some local laws or
customs among the native people and even the incorporation of some of those
laws and customs as part of the common law’.140 Deane and Gaudron JJ
suggested that if Crown officers had been aware of the numbers of Aboriginal
inhabitants of the Australian continent and the sophistication of their laws and
customs, they would not have considered the territory unoccupied.141
Furthermore, their Honours’ distinguished the line of Australian cases142
which supported one or both of the broad propositions that New South Wales
of a doctrine prescribing the effect of a change in sovereignty on pre-existing rights to land
(the doctrine of continuity or the recognition doctrine). Although the English common law,
as it was understood in Australia pre-Mabo, appeared certain with respect to determining
whether a colony was deemed to be settled, conquered or ceded, and whether English law
was automatically introduced or local laws retained (see Part 1, text accompanying
nn 195ff), the common law with respect to the effect of Crown acquisition of territory on
pre-existing rights to land was not so clear: see Secher, above n 116.
136 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 79.
137 Ibid, at CLR 81.
138 Id, citing Deloherty v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW (1904) 1 CLR 283 at 299–300;
Williams v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913) 16 CLR 404.
139 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 79, citing Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cas 286 at 291.
140 Id.
141 Ibid, at CLR 99–100.
142 Ibid, at CLR 102–3. In particular, Deane and Gaudron JJ considered (at 103) that one of
these cases, Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cas at 291, had subsequently been seen as
‘authoritatively establishing that the territory of New South Wales had, in 1788, been terra
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had been unoccupied for practical purposes and that the unqualified legal and
beneficial ownership of all land in the colony vested in the Crown, as obiter.143
Accordingly, their Honours concluded that the application of settled principle
to current understanding of the facts compelled the result that ‘the common
law applicable to the colony in 1788, and thereafter until altered by valid
legislation, preserved and protected the pre-existing claims of Aboriginal
tribes . . . to particular areas of land’.144
Thus, although applying the received view of the doctrine of reception, the
new element introduced by Deane and Gaudron JJ was the express adjustment
of the applicable common law to include a strong assumption that native title
interests were respected and protected by the domestic law of the colony after
its establishment. In this way, the common law acknowledged that Australia,
while settled, was not legally uninhabited. For Deane and Gaudron JJ,
therefore, the colonial law determining that a colony was settled and that
English law was automatically introduced (the doctrine of reception) included
the doctrine of continuity. Although Brennan and Toohey JJ also reconcile the
two limbs of the common law determining the system of law applicable upon
colonisation, their reasoning is fundamentally different.145
According to Justice Toohey, although the Murray Islands were ‘settled’146
by Britain for the purposes of acquisition of sovereignty, ‘it did not follow
that [common law] principles of land law relevant to the acquisition of vacant
land [were] applicable’.147 His Honour emphasised that the ‘idea that land
which is in regular occupation’ should be regarded as terra nullius is
unacceptable in law as well as fact.148Applying current information regarding
Aboriginal people to show that the land was in fact occupied on settlement, his
Honour observed that upon acquisition of sovereignty, indigenous inhabitants
became British subjects and, in the case of a settled colony like Australia, their
interests were to be protected by the immediate operation of the common law.
Toohey J explained that because the real question was whether the rights of
the Meriam people to the Islands survived acquisition of sovereignty, common
law dicta which, although acknowledging that, on settlement, land vested in
the Crown, was not made in the context of the question of Aboriginal
entitlement to land was irrelevant.
It is clear that Toohey J considered the received view of the doctrine of
nullius not in the sense of unclaimed by any other European power, but in the sense of
unoccupied or uninhabited for the purposes of the law’.
143 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 101–4.
144 Ibid, at CLR 100.
145 It is suggested that it is because Deane and Gaudron JJ’s analysis preserves the distinction
between the doctrine of reception and the doctrine of continuity, that their Honour’s
conception of radical title (unlike Brennan and Toohey JJ’s) confers beneficial ownership to
land not subject to native title (as was the view under the conventional doctrine of
reception).
146 Or ‘occupied’ to use the term of international law.
147 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 182.
148 Id. His Honour also considered that the proposition that land which is not in regular
occupation is terra nullius required greater scrutiny: there may be good reason why the
occupation is irregular. He did, however, confirm that the doctrine of terra nullius had no
application to the present case.
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reception as inapplicable to the Australian situation.149 Rather than English
law applying as though the territory was uninhabited, the doctrine of
continuity applied automatically to protect native rights to land. Although
Toohey J states the result of a different rule for prescribing the law that applied
upon settlement of Australia, he fails to explicate this alternative rule — an
explication comprehensively proffered by Brennan J.
Brennan J observed that the common law had had to ‘march in step with
international law in order to provide the body of law to apply in a territory
newly acquired by the Crown’.150 His Honour found, however, that the
acquisition of territory by way of the enlarged doctrine of terra nullius raised
difficulties in determining what law was to be applied when inhabited
territories were acquired by occupation (or ‘settlement’, to use the term of the
common law).151 Brennan J thus transposed the concept of terra nullius into
the Australian common law by suggesting that the operation of the
international law principles governing acquisition of territory had created an
anomaly for the domestic law. Although the enlarged doctrine of terra nullius
allowed Australia to be acquired by occupation, even though it was inhabited,
Brennan J noted that Blackstone152 was unable to expound any rule by which
the common law of England became the law of a territory which was not
uninhabited when the Crown acquired sovereignty over the territory by
occupation.153 Consequently, the common law had to prescribe a doctrine
relating to the law to be applied in such colonies. Pre-Mabo:
The view was taken that, when sovereignty of a territory could be acquired under the
enlarged notion of terra nullius, for the purposes of municipal law that territory
(though inhabited) could be treated as ‘desert uninhabited’ country. The hypothesis
being that there was no local law already in existence in the territory, the law of
England became the law of the territory (and not merely the personal law of the
colonists).154
Thus, the theory advanced to support the application of English law to
colonial New South Wales was that because the indigenous inhabitants were
regarded as ‘barbarous or unsettled and without a settled law’, the law of
England, including the common law, became the law of the colony as though
it was an uninhabited colony.155 The result was that ‘the settlement of an
inhabited territory [was] equated with settlement of an uninhabited territory in
ascertaining the law of the territory on colonisation . . .’.156
Although contemporary law accepted that the laws of England, so far as
149 And thus accords with Brennan J’s approach.
150 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 32. This was because the manner in which a sovereign acquires
new territory is a matter of international law and, by the common law, the law in force in a
newly-acquired territory depends upon the manner of its acquisition by the Crown.
151 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 33.
152 Blackstone, above n 25, (Facsimile of the First Edition), p 104; (15th ed), p 107.
153 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 33–4.
154 Ibid, at CLR 36.
155 Ibid, at CLR 37–8.
156 Ibid, at CLR 37. Moreover, because the indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony and their
occupancy of colonial land were ignored in considering the title to land, the ‘Crown’s
sovereignty over a territory which had been acquired under the enlarged notion of terra
nullius was equated with Crown ownership of the lands therein’: Mabo, above n 6, at CLR
40.
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applicable, became the laws of New South Wales and of the other Australian
colonies, Brennan J considered that the theory advanced to support the
introduction of the common law could be abandoned. Because the present
understanding and appreciation of the facts157 ‘do not fit the “absence of law”
or “barbarian” theory underpinning the colonial reception of the common law
of England’,158 Brennan J found that there was no warrant for contemporary
law to continue to apply English legal propositions which were the product of
that theory.159
Brennan J also considered that the theory advanced to justify depriving
indigenous inhabitants of a proprietary interest in the land, was unacceptable
as it was ‘unjust’160 and ‘depended on a discriminatory denigration of
indigenous inhabitants, their social organisation and customs’.161 His Honour
strongly criticised the discriminatory doctrine formulated by the Privy Council
in In re Southern Rhodesia162 which had been applied to the detriment of the
plaintiffs in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd.163 In classifying systems of native
law for the purpose of determining whether rights under it are to be recognised
at common law, the Privy Council implied the existence of a natural hierarchy
of societies, some being ‘so low in the scale of social organisation that their
usages and conceptions of rights and duties are not to be reconciled with the
institutions or the legal ideas of a civilised society’.164 Accordingly, if the
inhabitants of a colony had no meaningful or recognisable system of land
tenure, the colony was considered ‘desert uninhabited’ territory for legal
purposes.165 For Brennan J, the court was faced with two options:
157 His Honour’s conclusion was supported by evidence demonstrating the existence of a
complex and settled relationship of rights and obligations between the indigenous people
and their land: the findings of Moynihan J are summarised at CLR 17–18, 21–2, 24. See also
Blackburn J’s findings on the evidence presented in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17
FLR 141 at 267: ‘The evidence shows a subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to the
country in which the people led their lives, which provided a stable order of society and was
remarkably free from the vagaries of personal whim or influence. If ever a system could be
called “a government of laws, and not of men”, it is that shown in the evidence before me’.
Thus, faced with a contradiction between the authority of the Privy Council in Cooper v
Stuart and the evidence, Blackburn J concluded that the class to which a colony belonged
was a question of law, not of fact: Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 at 244;
[1972-73] ALR 65, see also Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 39 per Brennan J.
158 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 39.
159 Ibid, at CLR 38, 39.
160 Ibid, at CLR 42.
161 Ibid, at CLR 40. See also 42.
162 [1919] AC 211.
163 (1971) 17 FLR 141; [1972-73] ALR 65.
164 [1919] AC 211 at 233–4.
165 This theory suggested a possible ground of distinction in the case of settled territories and
led to detailed analysis of the legal and social systems of the plaintiffs in Milirrpum v
Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141; [1972-73] ALR 65 and in Mabo. If accepted, this
distinction could conceivably have seen a distinction drawn between the rights of the
Meriam people and other Aboriginal and Islander people on the basis that some were more
‘civilised’ than others. Brennan J clearly repudiated the In re Southern Rhodesia doctrine to
the extent that it dismissed a priori the claims of native inhabitants of settled colonies: see
Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 40 et seq.
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the court could either apply the existing authorities and proceed to inquire whether
the Meriam people [were] higher ‘in the scale of social organisation’166 than the
Australian Aborigines whose claims were ‘utterly disregarded’ by the existing
authorities or the court [could] overrule the existing authorities, discarding the
distinction between inhabited colonies that were terra nullius and those that were
not.167
Observing that the notion that inhabited land may be classified as terra
nullius no longer commands general support in international law,168 Brennan J
chose the latter option. Since Australia was in fact inhabited at the time of
colonisation, it could not, at common law, be considered uninhabited for legal
purposes. Consequently, the conventional doctrine of reception could not
apply to the colony. Effectively, therefore, Brennan J (and thus the majority)
identified Australia as a new class of settled colony at common law: one over
which sovereignty had been acquired via occupation of territory that was terra
nullius; yet one acquired, at common law, by settlement of territory that was
not legally uninhabited.169 Consequently, Brennan J had to prescribe a new
doctrine relating to the law that applied in the colony. This allowed him to
find, retrospectively, that the common law that applies in inhabited settled
colonies presumptively recognises native title rights to land.170 In finding that
prior native rights in land were presumed to be recognised, his Honour
followed Blackstone171 and regarded occupation as the natural law basis of
ownership rather than the attainment of any particular degree of
civilisation.172
In reaching this conclusion, Brennan J equated ‘the indigenous inhabitants
of a settled colony with the inhabitants of a conquered colony in respect of
166 With respect, this was the theory advanced to justify the extension of the doctrine of terra
nullius to the acquisition of inhabited territories by occupation under international law, and
not to determine what system of law would be applied and what proprietary rights would be
recognised in settled colonies: see In re Southern Rhodesia [1919] AC 11 at 233–4.
167 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 40. His Honour’s reference to terra nullius merely acknowledged
that when sovereignty of a territory was acquired under the enlarged doctrine of terra
nullius, it followed that for the purposes of the common law that such territory was treated
as ‘desert and uninhabited’ although it was inhabited: at 36.
168 Relying on the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara (1975) 1
ICJR 12 at 39, 85–6.
169 A division of ceded territories into two classes, those acquired by an act of cession from
some sovereign power and those ceded by the general consent of the inhabitants, was
suggested by the respondent in Sammut v Strickland [1938] AC 678 at 699–701. The Privy
Council, however, rejected this contention as they interpreted it to mean that British
possessions acquired by voluntary cession would, in effect, be British settlements: at 700.
Observing that ‘until the present case no one seems to have distinguished or divided cessions
to the Crown in the way suggested’, they nevertheless noted that cases of voluntary cession
are rare and urged that the case had been neglected by text-book writers and had not been
noticed by the Legislature: at 700–1.
170 This finding reconciled the two strands of the common law that, pre-Mabo, determined the
system of law applicable upon colonisation: see Secher, above n 116, text immediately
following n 35 and nn 145–151.
171 W Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England: Of the Rights of Things,
A Facsimile of the First Edition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979, p 8.
172 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 45. His Honour observed that:
It was only by fastening on the notion that a settled colony was terra nullius that it was
possible to predicate of the Crown the acquisition of ownership of land in a colony
already occupied by indigenous inhabitants. It was only on the hypothesis that there was
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their rights and interests in land’.173 This comparison has a critical
implication: it limits the practical consequences of Brennan J’s reasoning to
rights to land.174
According to Brennan J’s analysis, the effect of a change in sovereignty in
the context of the inhabited settled colony of Australia, was not that English
land law immediately applied (as would have been the case in a settled
uninhabited territory), but that the local land law continued until replaced by
the new sovereign (like the legal position in a conquered territory).175 The
crucial point is that, as a result of the High Court’s restatement of the effect
of the colonisation of Australia and reception of English law, the legal
consequences that flow from the feudal character of the English doctrine of
tenure no longer apply ipso jure in Australia: rather than acquiring absolute
beneficial ownership of all land, the Crown acquired only a radical title to all
land. Although the ‘postulate of the doctrine of tenure’ limb of radical title
continues to assure the Crown of its Paramount Lordship over tenures created
by Crown grant, it does so in new, limited circumstances. Only when the
Crown exercises its power to grant an estate in land is such land brought
within the tenurial regime.
4 Post-Mabo developments
A High Court decisions
Although there have been a number of important High Court decisions on
native title since Mabo, the correctness of the decision in Mabo and the
fundamental principle which it establishes, namely that, contrary to the
previous understanding of the law, native title survived the Crown’s
acquisition of sovereignty in Australia, has not been challenged. Similarly, it
has not been contested that the Crown, as Sovereign, had the power, in
accordance with law, to deal with land in every part of Australia and to the
extent that it did so in a way which was inconsistent with native title, native
title was extinguished.176 Following the High Court decisions in Western
nobody in occupation that it could be said that the Crown was the owner because there
was no other. If that hypothesis be rejected, the notion that sovereignty carried ownership
in its wake must be rejected too.
173 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 57. Cf n 189 below. Thus recognition of pre-existing rights was
limited to rights in land. See also Secher, above n 3, Ch 9, esp pp 510–13.
174 See also Secher, above n 5, where the author argues that similar recognition of Aboriginal
customary laws beyond those relating to land cannot be based upon the Mabo principle.
175 Although the foregoing analysis suggests that the classification of a colony as either
conquered, ceded or ‘inhabited settled’ determines the scope of the sovereign’s power to
extinguish pre-existing rights, it does not explain the legal basis for such a distinction. Why
did Brennan J treat the sovereign’s power of extinguishment in an inhabited settled colony
as greater than the sovereign’s power of extinguishment in conquered or ceded colonies?
The explanation is found in the distinction between the scope of the Crown’s prerogative
powers in inhabited settled colonies, on the one hand, and in conquered or ceded colonies,
on the other: see Secher, above n 116, cited with approval by the Federal Court in Gumana
v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457; 218 ALR 292 at [121].
176 See nn 189fff below.
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Australia v Commonwealth,177 Wik,178 Fejo v Northern Territory,179 Yanner v
Eaton,180 Commonwealth v Yarmirr,181 Western Australia v Ward,182 Wilson v
Anderson183 and Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v
Victoria184 it is also clear that the majority of Brennan J’s reasoning in Mabo
has been accepted by the High Court as the fundamental statement of the
recognition and extinguishment of native title by the Australian common
law.185 Moreover, members of the currently constituted High Court have
expressed views on the ‘increasingly questioned fiction of tenure’,186 ‘radical
177 (1995) 183 CLR 373 at 422–3, 439, 452 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron
and McHugh JJ; 492, 493–5 per Dawson J; 128 ALR 1.
178 (1996) 187 CLR 1 at 84–5 per Brennan CJ (with whom McHugh and Dawson JJ agreed: 167
and 100 respectively); 135 per Gaudron J; 175–6 per Gummow J; 213–14, 250 per Kirby J.
Toohey J noted (at 129) that ‘[w]hile nothing in the judgments of the court, in particular
those in Mabo (No 2), point with any certainty to the answers demanded of the court in the
present proceedings, that decision is a valuable starting point because it explores the
relationship between the common law and the “law” which evidences native title rights’. For
a detailed examination of theWik High Court’s treatment of the two limbs of radical title, see
Secher, above n 3, Chs 3 and 4.
179 (1998) 195 CLR 96; 156 ALR 721; 72 ALJR 1442 at [46]–[49] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron,
McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ; [95]–[105] per Kirby J. This decision is
considered in the context of the two limbs of radical title by Secher, above n 3, Ch 4.
180 (1999) 201 CLR 351; 166 ALR 258 at [35] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ;
[60], [72] per Gummow J. In Yanner v Eaton, a majority of the High Court held that
legislation regulating the keeping and taking of estuarine crocodiles did not extinguish
native title. Thus, the High Court simply decided that there was no extinguishment of native
title in this case.
181 (2001) 208 CLR 1; 184 ALR 113 at [46], [48] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and
Hayne JJ; [117], [161], [178] per McHugh J; [293] per Kirby J; [324] per Callinan J. For a
detailed examination of this case in the context of radical title as a concomitant of
sovereignty, see Secher, above n 3, Ch 5.
182 (2002) 213 CLR 1; 191 ALR 1. In this case, the court emphasised that the extinguishment
of native title was governed by the NTA; that is statute lay at the core of the litigation: at [2],
[1]. Indeed, the High Court distinguished the decisions in Mabo, Wik, Fejo and Yanner v
Eaton as not having been given in respect of applications under the NTA: at [2].
Consequently, the only relevance of those decisions was for ‘whatever light they cast on the
NTA: at [25]. For a detailed examination of this case in the context of the two limbs of
radical title, see Secher, above n 3, Ch 4.
183 (2002) 213 CLR 401; 190 ALR 313. Although the majority of the High Court in this case
(like the court in Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1; 191 ALR 1) resolved the
issues before them by reference to the NTA rather than the common law, they emphasised
that the ‘common law’ test of extinguishment is ‘exemplified in Wik’: at [47]. For a detailed
examination of this case in the context of the two limbs of radical title, see Secher, above n
3, Ch 4.
184 (2002) 214 CLR 422; 194 ALR 538 at [133] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ; [172]
per Callinan J.
185 See also B Selway QC, ‘The Role of Policy in the Development of Native Title’ (2000) FLR
403 at 415.
186 Wik, above n 22, at CLR 177–84 per Gummow J; 205–7 per Toohey J; 243, 244 per Kirby J;
Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96; 156 ALR 721; 72 ALJR 1442 at [108] per
Kirby J; Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1; 184 ALR 113 at [212] per McHugh J.
See also Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316; 170 ALR 159 at [805]ff, where
North J suggests that the doctrine of tenure should continue to be modified, and Lansen v
Olney (1999) 100 FCR 7; 169 ALR 49 at [42], where French J noted that: ‘[s]tatutory
reforms in England, many of them mirrored in Australia, have substantially suppressed the
practical consequences of tenure but they have not struck at the root of the theory of tenure
itself’.
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title as a postulate of the doctrine of tenure’187 and the ‘extent of the reception
of English land law’188 which support the Mabo court’s redefined doctrine of
tenure.
Significantly, in Wik, a reconstituted High Court reviewed the implications
of Mabo for Australian real property law. By considering the consequences of
pastoral leases for native title, the High Court had a second opportunity to
assess the applicability of English land law in the Australian context. The
essence of the decision in Wik lies in saying that a pastoral lease, being a
special measure to provide for Australian conditions, is not a lease as
understood in English land law. For the majority, therefore, a pastoral lease
does not confer a right of exclusive possession on the grantee and,
consequently, the grant of a pastoral lease will not necessarily extinguish
native title rights and interests that may exist in or over the subject land.
Nevertheless, the majority made it clear that, to the extent that the rights of the
grantee of a pastoral lease were inconsistent with the continued enjoyment of
native title, the native title interest must yield.189
More importantly, however, one of the main legal arguments in Wik (based
on Brennan J’s ‘reversion expectant’ theory espoused in Mabo),190 was
whether the mere grant of a pastoral lease, or for that matter of any leasehold
interest in land, changed the underlying title of the Crown by creating a
reversion expectant, thereby converting the underlying title of the Crown from
mere radical title to full beneficial title, such that upon expiry of the term of
the interest full beneficial ownership would revert to the Crown. The majority
denied that the Crown acquired a beneficial reversionary interest upon the
grant of the relevant pastoral leases, with the result that the underlying title of
the Crown continued to be mere radical title.191
The minority, on the other hand, adopted Brennan J’s dictum in Mabo that
the doctrine of tenure was brought into play as soon as the Crown granted an
interest in land192 and concluded that:
187 Wik, above n 22, at CLR 186 per Gummow J; 128 per Toohey J (expressly approving of
Brennan J’s statement of principle in Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 50); Commonwealth v
Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1; 184 ALR 113 at [49], [70], [71], [75] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron,
Gummow and Hayne JJ; [178], [212] per McHugh J.
188 Wik, above n 22, at CLR 182 per Gummow J.
189 Wik, above n 22, at CLR 133 (postscript contained in Toohey J’s reasons and added with the
concurrence of the other majority judges).
190 In Mabo, above n 6, Brennan J discussed how native title can be extinguished by a Crown
grant which vests in the grantee an interest in land which is inconsistent with the continued
right to enjoy a native title in respect of the same land, stating at CLR 68: ‘[i]f a lease be
granted, the lessee acquires possession and the Crown acquires the reversion expectant on
the expiry of the term. The Crown’s title is thus expanded from a mere radical title and, on
the expiry of the term, becomes a plenum dominium.’ See also 49. In Wik, above n 22,
Brennan CJ, as author of the minority judgment, reiterated these comments (at CLR 154).
For a detailed discussion of the ‘reversion expectant’ theory, see Secher, above n 3, Ch 4,
Part 2.
191 Wik, above n 22, at CLR 128, 129 per Toohey J; 155 per Gaudron J; 189 per Gummow J;
244–5 per Kirby J. The implications of the Wik decision for the Crown’s title on the grant
of any interest in land are examined by Secher, above n 3, Ch 4.
192 Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 48–9.
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once land is brought within [the doctrine of tenure], it is impossible to admit an
interest which is not derived mediately or immediately from a Crown grant or which
is not carved out of an estate or the Crown’s reversionary interest.193
For the minority, therefore, it was necessary to treat the Crown, on exercise
of the power of alienation of an estate, as having the full legal reversionary
interest. The minority also relied upon traditional property law authorities to
characterise the pastoral leases issued under statute as common law leases
conferring a right to exclusive possession.
The divergence between the majority and minority judgments inWik can be
summarised in terms of differing approaches taken towards the utility of
conventional English land law concepts once the Australian doctrine of tenure
has been brought into play. The crucial point, however, is that the majority’s
decision questions the applicability of the Australian doctrine of tenure
notwithstanding the grant of an interest in land by the Crown, at least in the
case of the grant of a pastoral lease.194 That is, although the fiction of original
Crown ownership is brought into play, to ensure the Crown its rights as
Paramount Lord, whenever the Crown exercises its sovereign power to grant
an interest in land, it is clear that this fiction does not confer a beneficial
reversionary title on the Crown.195
The Wik High Court rejected the beneficial reversion expectant argument
specifically in the context of the statutory grant of an interest not given its
content by the common law. Although the majority of the High Court in
Western Australia v Ward196 (Ward) subsequently held that a common law
lease extinguished native title, this was based solely on the court’s formulation
and application of the inconsistency of incidents test for the purposes of the
NTA, rather than on an expansion of the Crown’s radical title at common law.
Indeed, since the Ward High Court did not address the issue of the nature of
the Crown’s reversion, if any, upon the grant of the lease, there is no
authoritative decision on the legal implications for the Crown’s title of the
193 Wik, above n 22, at CLR 93.
194 The role of the Australian doctrine of tenure on the grant of any lease, including a common
law lease, will be discussed in Part 4. Bhuta and McDermott have both argued that the
decision in Wik emphasised that the feudal notions of tenure are inappropriate to modern
Australia: N Bhuta, ‘Mabo, Wik and the Art of Paradigm Management’ (1998) 22 MULR 24
at 32–7; P M McDermott, ‘Wik and the Doctrine of Tenures: A Synopsis’ in G Hiley (Ed),
The Wik Case: Issues and Implications, Butterworths, Sydney, 1997, pp 37–9. See also
Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316; 170 ALR 159 at [805]ff where North J
suggests that the doctrine of tenure should continue to be modified; cf Wik, above n 22,
at CLR 89–91 per Brennan CJ; Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96; 156 ALR
721; 72 ALJR 1442 at [112] per Kirby J; Selway, above n 185, esp pp 421, 431. In Fejo v
Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96; 156 ALR 721; 72 ALJR 1442 at [112], Kirby J
attempts to reconcile the approaches, stating that the better position is that Wik did not reject
the doctrine of tenure as it applies in Australia. Rather, the majority simply viewed the
pastoral leases examined in that case as ‘falling outside traditional land law’. They were to
be viewed as creatures of the Australian legislature with features distinguishing their legal
character from common law leases and thus they did not attract some of the attributes of a
common law lease in accordance with the doctrine of tenure.
195 Indeed, it is clear that since radical title, as a concomitant of sovereignty, confers power on
the Crown to grant unalienated land (whether occupied or unoccupied) in every part of
Australia, that the Crown’s power of alienation is divorced from the assumption that the
Crown is the original proprietor of all land
196 (2002) 213 CLR 1; 191 ALR 1 (Ward).
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grant of a common law lease from the High Court.197 Accordingly, Wik
continues to be authoritative not only in the context of the nature of the
Crown’s title at the expiration of a lease, but also in the context of the common
law doctrine of extinguishment.198 What emerges from the Wik majority’s
reasoning is a further ‘Australianisation’ of the land law lexicon.
5 Conclusion
The High Court’s conception of the Australian doctrine of tenure, with radical
title as its postulate, was only possible because the court clarified the doctrine
of reception as it applied to Australia.199 In this context, the High Court
rejected the common law classification of inhabited land as ‘desert and
uncultivated’, or ‘legally uninhabited’, for the purpose of determining the
197 It is clear that, as a result of the NTA, the grant of such leases extinguish native title. Indeed,
the High Court’s decision in Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1; 191 ALR 1
at [369]–[372] has confirmed this. There is also High Court obiter to this effect at common
law: see, eg, Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 68 per Brennan J; 110 per Gaudron and Deane JJ.
Gaudron J (at 155) also proceeded on this assumption in Wik and Gummow J expressed this
view in Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351; 166 ALR 258 at [108]. Although there was
argument, in Mabo, about whether the lease of a sardine factory and a lease to the London
Missionary Society extinguished native title, the declaration made by the court did not
determine these issues. Notwithstanding the suggested legal implications for the Crown’s
title of the grant of a common law lease, however, there is no authoritative decision on the
issue from the High Court: although the majority of the High Court in Western Australia v
Ward held that a common law lease extinguished native title, this was based on the court’s
application of the inconsistency of incidents test for the purposes of the NTA, rather than on
an expansion of the Crown’s radical title at common law. Nevertheless, even if the grant of
an exclusive possession lease has the effect, at common law, of extinguishing native title,
since any such extinguishment occurs as a result of inconsistency between the lessee’s rights
under the lease and the native title rights, and not as a result of the Crown’s acquisition of
a beneficial title on making the grant, such extinguishment does not, of itself, have any
significance for the Crown’s title. Thus, the question is: do any residuary rights to the land
in respect of which the lease was granted automatically lie with the Crown? In other words,
is native title extinguished by the grant of a common law lease because of an expansion of
the Crown’s radical title or because of inconsistency between the interest granted and the
continued enjoyment of native title? In this context, the author has argued that the rationales
underlying the individual judgments in Wik indicate how the justices might resolve the legal
implications, for the Crown’s title, of the statutory grant of interests in land other than
pastoral leases, including the grant of a true common law lease. Indeed, the author has
shown that (i) the grant by the Crown of a common law lease relying upon its radical title
does not result in an expansion of radical title to a beneficial title and (ii) there is judicial
support for the proposition that, at common law, the grant of an exclusive possession lease
does not effect an extinguishment of native title but merely suspends it for the duration of
the grant: see U Secher, ‘A Common Law Doctrine of Suspension of Native Title? Judicial
Interpretations of the “Reversion Expectant Argument” and the concept of “Operational
Inconsistency’: Part 1’ (2005) 12(3) APLJ 1 and ‘A Common Law Doctrine of Suspension
of Native Title? Judicial Interpretations of the “Reversion Expectant Argument” and the
concept of “Operational Inconsistency”: Part 2’ (2005) 12(3) APLJ 26.
198 That is, the majority of the High Court in both Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR
1; 191 ALR 1 andWilson v Anderson (2002) 213 CLR 401; 190 ALR 313 resolved the issues
before them by reference to the NTA rather than the common law. Indeed, the majority of the
Wilson High Court emphasised that the ‘common law’ test of extinguishment is ‘exemplified
in Wik’: at [47].
199 For the pre-Mabo and post-Mabo legal position in this context see Part 1, text accompanying
nn 180ff and Part 2, text accompanying nn 116ff respectively. See also Secher, above n 3,
Ch 1, pp 33–40 and Ch 3, pp 137–59 respectively.
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system of law applicable upon settlement. The High Court did not, however,
re-classify Australia as ‘conquered’ or ‘ceded’ rather than ‘settled’. That is, by
proceeding within a framework of general principles of municipal law, the
court rejected the legal doctrine classifying inhabited land as uninhabited in its
application to questions of property at common law, but not in its application
to the establishment of English sovereignty in international law.200
Nevertheless, and the crucial point is that, although the High Court accepted
that Australia was a settled territory, six justices changed the law that applies
to a colony acquired by settlement where the colony was not previously
uninhabited.
Under the common law pre-Mabo, the necessary result of the categorisation
of a colony as settled (whether uninhabited in fact or ‘legally uninhabited’)
was that English law, including the feudal doctrine of tenure, applied ipso jure
throughout the colony. However, by ascribing to Australia the status of a new
colony, a settled yet inhabited colony, the Mabo High Court was free to
prescribe (and indeed had to prescribe because there was no law on point) a
doctrine relating to the law that applied in the colony: that is, a modified
doctrine of reception.
The application of the new doctrine of reception to Australia meant that,
like other settled territories, the common law of England applied as far as
applicable;201 but unlike other settlements, English common law principles
relating to land did not immediately apply. In particular, rather than acquiring
absolute beneficial ownership of ‘every square inch of land’,202 the Crown
acquired only a radical title to all land. Rejection of the conventional approach
undermined the dual feudal fiction which is fundamental to the English
doctrine of tenure.
Indeed, it was the rejection of the fiction of original Crown ownership of all
land that facilitated the High Court’s redefinition of the foundational doctrine
of tenure, which would otherwise have applied as universally as it does in
England.203As a result of the Australian version of the doctrine of tenure, with
radical title as its postulate, common law recognition of rights in land created
200 See text accompanying nn 127ff above.
201 Blankard v Galdy (1693) Holt KB 341; PC Memorandum (1722) 2 PWms 75; R v Vaughan
(1769) 4 Burr 2494 at 2500; Forbes v Cochrane (1824) 2 B & C 448 at 463; Kielley v
Carson (1843) 4 Moo PC 63 at 84–5; The Lauderale Peerage (1885) 10 App Cas 692
at 744–5; Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cas 286 at 291–2. The situation that English law
accompanied the colonists to the extent that it was applicable to local circumstances in
settled territories, had the result that, apart from statute, the Crown had no legislative
authority: Jennings v Hunt (1820) 1 Nfld LR 220 at 225; affd sub nom Hunt v Jennings
(1827) PC, no reasons: see Privy Council, ‘Printed Cases in Indian and Colonial Appeals
Heard in 1827’, 333 at 362; G S Lester, ‘Primitivism versus Civilisation’ in C Brice-Bennett
(Ed), Our Footprints are Everywhere, 351 at 371 n 77 cited by McNeil, Common Law
Aboriginal Title, above n 1, p 115 n 27; Kielley v Carson (1843) 4 Moo PC 63 at 84; Sammut
v Strictland [1938] AC 678 at 701; H V Evatt, ‘The Legal Foundations of New South Wales’
(1938) 11 ALJ 409 at 421–2. Thus, although the Crown had power to establish courts of
justice and constitute a representative assembly, the British Settlements Acts (6 & 7 Vict,
c 13; 23 and 24 Vict, c 121; 50 & 51 Vict, c 54, amended 9 Geo VI, c 7) were passed to give
the Crown legislative authority over settlements not within British legislative jurisdiction:
Sabally & N’Jie v Attorney-General [1964] 3 WLR 732 at 744–5.
202 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 at 245 per Blackburn J; [1972-73] ALR 65.
203 See Part I, text accompanying nn 104ff.
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outside the doctrine of tenure is possible. This is because the ‘postulate of the
doctrine of tenure’ limb of radical title ensures that the common law regime
governing the Australian doctrine of tenure is only brought into play when the
Crown grants an interest in land.204
Thus, the doctrine of tenure has a limited role in Australian land law. Title
to land is no longer exclusively derivative; all titles to land can no longer,
theoretically, be traced back to a Crown grant. Only when the Crown exercises
its power to grant an estate in land is such land brought within the tenurial
regime. This is crucial and represents the essential point of divergence
between the Australian and English versions of the doctrine of tenure.
Contrary to the position in England, under the Australian doctrine of tenure
the two-fold feudal fiction of original Crown ownership of all land and
original Crown grant no longer applies.205 The fiction of original Crown grant
has been rendered otiose and the fiction of original Crown ownership is no
longer of universal application, having been replaced with the ‘fiction of
original Crown ownership of land which has actually been granted by the
Crown’.206 By substituting the ‘feudal fiction’ with the more limited ‘mere
radical title fiction’, regardless of the demographics of a territory, the Crown’s
initial rights over land in Australia are no longer as fictional as under feudal
theory.
Nevertheless, when the Crown has in fact exercised its sovereign power to
grant an interest in land, radical title allows the surviving, albeit no longer
ubiquitous, fictional explanation of the doctrine of tenure, that the Crown
originally owned all land, to apply to ensure the Crown of its feudal rights. In
this way, radical title as the postulate of the doctrine of tenure enables the
Crown to become Paramount Lord of all who hold a tenure granted by the
Crown. Under the Australian doctrine of tenure, however, the fiction of
original Crown ownership is excluded in respect of land which has not been
the subject of an appropriate Crown grant (unalienated land, even if
unoccupied at settlement).207 Indeed, even if this fiction is excluded only in
respect of land which is both subject to pre-existing native title and which has
not been brought within the doctrine (unalienated and occupied land), the
effect of the fiction in the context of unalienated and unoccupied land is not
to give the Crown title to land.208 The fictional explanation merely justifies the
feudal concept of Paramount Lordship.209
204 To borrow Brennan J’s words: it enables the common law regime governing the Australian
doctrine of tenure to apply ‘to every Crown grant of an interest in land, but not to rights and
interests which do not owe their existence to a Crown grant’:Mabo, above n 6, at CLR 48–9
per Brennan J.
205 The two-fold fiction accompanying the English (feudal) doctrine of tenure is discussed in
Part 1, text accompanying nn 104ff. See also Secher, above n 3, Ch 1, esp pp 22–6.
206 See text immediately following n 23 above.
207 The fiction also no longer applies in toto where land has been brought within the doctrine of
tenure but the particular Crown dealing with the land is ineffectual to confer absolute
beneficial ownership of the land on the Crown or a particular Crown grantee (eg, the grant
of a pastoral lease): see text accompanying n 189 above and Secher, above n 3, Ch 4.
208 This proposition is fully explored by Secher, above n 3, Ch 4, Part 2.
209 It was noted in Part 1, however, that the only two incidents of socage tenure that have been
of any practical importance in Australia, a rental payment in the form of a ‘quit rent’
reserved to the Crown in early Crown grants and escheat, have been abolished by statute: see
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In this context, the Wik High Court has made it clear that even when
previously unalienated land is brought within the regime governed by the
doctrine of tenure by the Crown grant of a pastoral lease, the effect of the
fiction of original Crown ownership is not to confer a beneficial reversionary
interest. That is, the Crown’s well established right of reversion on the grant
of a lease does not confer a beneficial title where the Crown did not have a
beneficial title before the grant. Thus, as Edgeworth has suggested, the
Australian doctrine of tenure ‘can be seen to have more in common with
allodial systems where citizens . . . receive out-and-out transfers of land’.210
The High Court’s restatement of the common law of Australia also makes
it clear that, in the case of unalienated land in respect of which pre-existing
native title exists, the Crown must exercise its sovereign power before its
underlying radical title converts to full beneficial ownership (the Crown must
acquire a plenary title to unalienated and occupied land by appropriating to
itself ownership of the land). Thus, in contradistinction to the Crown’s feudal
title, which is a denial of the distinction between public and private law,211 the
Crown’s radical title recognises the distinction between questions of
sovereignty and land law but ‘operates as a linking concept between the . . .
public law notion of sovereignty on the one hand, and the private law of
proprietary rights on the other’.212
The legal principles are clear, therefore, in respect of the presence of the
Crown’s Paramount Lordship over land which has been brought within the
doctrine of tenure (alienated land) and the absence of the Crown’s Paramount
Lordship over land which has not been brought within the doctrine of tenure
and which is subject to pre-existing native title (unalienated land subject to
native title). The legal principles are also clear in respect of the Crown’s
beneficial ownership of land which has been subject to pre-existing native title
where the Crown has effectively exercised its sovereign power to appropriate
the land to itself (alienated land subject to native title).
These principles, however, leave a crucial issue unresolved:213 what are the
Crown’s rights in relation to land which has neither been brought within the
doctrine of tenure by the Crown grant of an interest in the land nor
appropriated to the Crown such that the Crown has acquired a plenary title to
the land, where the land is not subject to pre-existing native title (unalienated
above n 175. In any event, the Crown’s well established prerogatives to escheat, reversion
and forfeiture do not confer automatic title on the Crown: see Secher, above n 3, Chs 4
(pp 209–11) and 7 (pp 425–9).
210 Edgeworth, above n 79, p 419.
211 F Pollock and F WMaitland, 1 The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, 2nd
ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968, pp 230–1.
212 Edgeworth, above n 79, p 415.
213 These principles are only entirely clear where the Crown has validly alienated land by
granting an interest that is wholly inconsistent with the continuing right to enjoy native title
or where the Crown has validly appropriated land to itself and the appropriation is wholly
inconsistent with a continuing right to enjoy native title. Where the Crown alienates land by
granting an interest that is partially inconsistent with a continuing right to enjoy native title,
and where the Crown has validly appropriated land to itself and the appropriation is partially
inconsistent with a continuing right to enjoy native title, the issue of extinguishment (and
thus, where beneficial ownership lies) is more complicated: see Secher, above n 3, Ch 4,
Part 2.
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land not subject to native title)? In other words: what is the effect of the High
Court’s restatement of the common law on the legal status of land in respect
of which the Crown does not have Paramount Lordship and which is not
subject to native title?
Although there is High Court obiter suggesting that unalienated and
unoccupied land belongs to the Crown because there is ‘no other
proprietor’,214 the High Court has not had the opportunity to authoritatively
determine this issue. Indeed, by suggesting, in Mabo, that the Crown must be
the absolute beneficial owner of unoccupied and unalienated lands because
there is ‘no other proprietor’, Brennan J, with whom Mason CJ and
McHugh JJ concurred, recognised that not all unalienated land in Australia is
subject to native title. The land is unoccupied because neither the Crown nor
Aboriginal people (in their capacity as ‘native title’ holders) occupy it.215
Indeed, although unalienated land is capable of supporting a native title
application, native title is not an institution of the common law. If, however,
there is a legal explanation to the question of property rights in unalienated
land that is not subject to enforceable native title, there is no need to resort to
a new legal fiction: the ‘no other proprietor’ fiction.
Indeed, since it is clear that the Australian doctrine of tenure is only brought
into play when the Crown grants an interest in land, the critical question is:
what law applies to the land prior to this? The Crown no longer necessarily
represents the only source of title to land. Although radical title as the
postulate of the Australian doctrine of tenure secures the Crown as one source
of derivative title to land (when the Crown has alienated land), it does not
preclude the existence of other interests in land which do not owe their
existence to a Crown grant. It has been seen that although, pre-Mabo,
acquisition of title by occupancy was severely restricted by the fiction that all
lands were originally possessed, and accordingly, owned, by the Crown,216
since Mabo, this fiction only applies in respect of a tenure created by Crown
grant.217 Accordingly, the fiction of original Crown ownership can no longer,
of itself, exclude acquisition of first title to unalienated and uninhabited real
property in Australia. There is, therefore, the potential to accommodate
sources of title in addition to Crown grant or native title within Australian land
law post-Mabo. Thus, while native title is currently the only non-Crown
derived title recognised by Australian courts which may burden the Crown’s
radical title, the Australian doctrine of tenure has significant implications for
Aboriginal people occupying unalienated land in circumstances where the
occupation does not satisfy the definition of native title.218
Moreover, it has been seen that the feudal theory that all lands are held
mediately or immediately of the Crown was always tempered by a number of
antithetical factors: in addition to the possible acquisition of title by virtue of
occupancy of a vacant pur autre vie estate, was the existence of allodial land
214 This basis for attributing absolute beneficial ownership on the Crown is further examined by
Secher, above n 3, Ch 4.
215 See above n 100.
216 See McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, above n 1, p 11 and authorities cited above n 19.
See also comments by Stephen CJ in Hatfield v Alford (1846) 1 Legge 330 at 337.
217 See text accompanying n 23 above.
218 See above n 108.
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and the acquisition of land rights by adverse possession and by virtue of
customary law predating the tenurial scheme.219 The crucial point is that these
‘exceptions’ to strict feudal theory can now be accommodated within
Australian land law as redefined by the High Court and, therefore, provide a
common law basis for rights as against the Crown to unalienated land
occupied by Aboriginal people.
Indeed, because the fiction of original Crown grant is no longer relevant in
the Australian context, does this mean that titles previously acquired pursuant
to grants which were deemed in law to have been made under the feudal
doctrine of tenure and, therefore, regarded as ‘exceptions’ to the doctrine of
tenure as there was no actual alienation by the Crown, now have a legal
explanation, including allodial landholding and the recognition of customary
law pre-dating the tenurial scheme?220Alternatively, does English law relating
to pre-feudal landholding apply; that is, the law relating to folkland, an
allodial system of customary landholding?221 In either case, the Australian
doctrine of tenure can accommodate Aboriginal customary law as an
independent source of non-derivative common law title to land. That is, as a
result of the High Court’s restatement of Australian real property law,
‘Aboriginal customary law title’ can be a valid common law alternative to
native title.
219 See Part 1, text immediately following nn 126ff.
220 See Part 1, text accompanying nn 129 and 139.
221 See Part 1, text immediately following nn 16ff.
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